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CONSULAR DISCRETION IN THE IMMIGRANT
VISA-ISSUING PROCESS*
A widespread belief exists that determinations to issue or re-
fuse immigrant visas are sometimes arbitrary or unlawful. This
Study, made possible by a National Science Foundation grant,
examines the exercise of discretion by consular officers in issuing
immigrant visas. First, the authors isolate those procedures and
factors that determine eligibility to immigrate mandated by the
Immigration and Nationality Ac4 particularly under the "public
charge" and 'fraud" provisions. Then, through interviews and
questionnaires, the authors detail and compare the typical proce-
dures and eligibility factors utilized by consular officers in the
field. Nex the study concentrates on the effect of the individual
consular officer's educational background, length of service, and
age upon his refusal rates. The authors conclude by recom-
mending ways to limit consular discretion.
INTRODUCTION
Informal and non-reviewable decisionmaking constitutes eighty
to ninety percent of the administrative process.' These informal
* Unless otherwise noted, citations to interviews with consular personnel are
cited as being with "consular officers" regardless of the rank of the interviewee.
Also, portions of some interview citations are omitted to preserve the anonymity
of the consular officer.
1. Davis, Behavioral Science and Administrative Law, 17 J. LEGAL Enuc. 137,
150 (1965). Discretionary decisions number in the billions annually. In compari-
son, the yearly number of civil and criminal cases commenced in all federal courts
is under 100,000, and the number going to trial is under 12,000. The amount of
thought involved in a discretionary decision varies from a fraction of a second to
several years. K. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 9 (1969).
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determinations have been the focus of surprisingly little study.2
Yet the impact of this informal process may be more important
than the formal judicial process because such decisions affect
thousands of individuals daily.
This Study examines the boundaries of individual decision-
making in one narrow area of administrative law. It scrutinizes
decisionmaking in the immigrant visa application pro-
cess-specifically, the decision of an individual consular officer to
grant or deny an immigrant visa to an applicant. In the area of
immigration, the impact of any decision can be especially crucial
to the individual involved. This Study investigates the discretion
granted to consular officers by statute or by regulation and evalu-
ates how individual officers utilize discretion throughout the deci-
sionmaking process.
An administrative official exercises discretion whenever the ef-
fective limits on his power allow him to decide among several
courses of action or of inaction. An individual officer's decision
includes an interpretation of the facts giving rise to the discre-
tionary problem and may cause an interpretation of unclear law.3
Differing values and influences can cause individual law-enforcers
to reach widely disparate decisions. This disparity leads to
nonuniform, unpredictable application of the law.
2. On the subject of discretionary justice, see generally ABA PROJECT ON
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION
FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (1971); A. CASTBERG, PROSECUTORIAL DIS-
CRETION: A CASE STUDY (1968); K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIuNARY
INQUIRY (1969); K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE IN EUROPE AND AMERICA (1976);
K. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION (1969); B. GROSMAN, THE PROSECUTOR: AN INQUIRY
INTO THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION (1969); M. KADISH & S. KADISH, DISCRETION TO
DISOBEY: A STUDY OF LAWFUL DEPARTURES FROM LEGAL RULES (1973); R. POUND,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA (1930); G. STEINBERG, CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN
CONNECTICUT. A STUDY IN DISCRETION (1940); Davis, Behavioral Science and Ad-
ministrative Law, 17 J. LEGAL EDUC. 137 (1965); Dill, Discretion, Exchange and So-
cial Control: Bail Bondsmen in Criminal Courts, 9 L & Soc. REV. 639 (1975); Grant
& Constable, Immigration Law: Deportation, 125 NEw L.J. 957 (1975); Panel,
Should People Stay at Home?, 68 Ams. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 38 (1974); Roberts, The
Exercise of Administrative Discretion Under the Immigration Laws, 13 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 144 (1975); Robertshaw, Unreasonableness and Judicial Control of Admin-
istrative Discretion: The Geology of the Chertsey Caravans Case, 1975 PUB. L. 113;
Rosenblum, On Davis on Confining, Structuring, and Checking Administrative
Discretion, in ADmISTRATIVE DISCRETION 50 (C. Havighurst ed. 1974); Sofaer, Ju-
dicial Control of Informal Discretionary Adjudication and Enforcement, 72
COLUM. L, REV. 1293 (1972); Strauss & Baskir, Controlling Discretion in Sentencing:
The Clemency Board as a Working Model, 51 NOTRE DAM.E LAw. 919 (1976); Note,
Administrative Lau-Expansive Discretion Allowed Executive Branch in Admis-
sion of Politically Disfavored Aliens, 22 BUFFALO L REV. 499 (1973); Recent Devel-
opment, Immigration: The Criterion of "Otherwise Admissible"as a Basis for Relief
From Deportation Because of Fraud or Misrepresentation, 66 COLmi. L. REV. 188
(1966); Wright, Book Review, 81 YALE L.J. 575 (1972).
3. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 5 (1969).
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Discretionary decisions having the force of law are made at rel-
atively low levels in many administrative agencies. Often such
decisions are for all practical purposes final. Although some ob-
servers believe that discretion is the principal source of creativity
in government and in law, discretion without meaningful stand-
ards may reduce rather than enhance the quality of justice. Ac-
cording to Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, "[dliscretionary power
may be too broad or too narrow. When it is too broad, justice may
suffer from arbitrariness or inequality. When it is too narrow, jus-
tice may suffer from insufficient individualizing."4 The greatest
hope for improving the quality of justice lies in the area of discre-
tionary decisionmaking.
Once it is acknowledged that discretionary power exists and
that its effects can be devastating to the individual involved, the
key question becomes: How can injustice to individuals resulting
from the exercise of discretionary power be reduced? Professor
Davis has proposed a framework that will limit unnecessary dis-
cretionary power and will structure and check desirable discre-
tionary power.
5
Confining discretion limits unnecessary power by establishing
boundaries within which discretion can be contained. Adminis-
trative clarification of vague statutory standards through policy
statements, adjudicatory opinions, or the exercise of rulemaking
power are methods of confining discretion. Thus, confining discre-
tion involves careful delimitation of an individual's power.6
Structuring discretionary power entails restraining the manner
in which officers exercise discretion once the boundaries of dis-
cretion have been established. Many tools could help structure
discretion. Published plans, policies, and rules clarify and regu-
late the procedure of the administrative agency. Published find-
ings of fact and of reasons behind decisions explain discretionary
decisions to the public. Articulation of a decision's underlying ra-
4. K. DAVIS, ADmNisTRATIV LAW CASES-TExT-PROBLEMS 449 (1973).
5. See Rosenblum, On Davis on Confining, Structuring, and Checking Admin-
istrative Discretion, in ADzmNISrRATrVE DiscRETION 50 (C. Havighurst ed. 1974).
These proposals have been enthusiastically accepted by at least one leading jurist,
Judge J. Skelly Wright of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, who has stated that "[a] dministrative discretion was created by
law, and there is no inherent reason why the law should be unable to control it."
Wright, Book Review, 81 YALE I.J. 575, 597 (1972).
6. See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 52-96 (1969),
for a detailed discussion of confining discretion.
tionale not only helps to clarify the law for administrative officials
but also serves the function of changing the exercise of discretion
into the making of law. Finally, a system of fair informal proce-
dure allows parties to be informed of the factors involved in mak-
ing any decision and to be given an opportunity to respond before
an agency renders a final decision.7
In addition to the methods of confining and of structuring dis-
cretion, review of officers' discretionary decisions can protect
against the capricious exercise of discretionary power. Com-
monly, review is by a superior officer. Other methods of review
include intervention by legislators, attorneys, private organiza-
tions, news media, courts, and administrative appellate tribunals.8
Because an adverse determination can have a drastic impact
upon an individual's life, the immigration setting provides an im-
portant forum in which to study informal administrative decision-
making. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (Act)9 gives
the United States the world's most detailed and complex provi-
sions pertaining to regulation of aliens applying for residence in a
sovereign State.O However, the statute's technicality invites mis-
interpretation or misapplication by those responsible for its en-
forcement.
The Act protects the domestic labor force by excluding un-
skilled or unwanted labor. It promotes public welfare through se-
lection of "immigrants who are highly skilled or trained in some
specialized field and whose training and experience might con-
tribute to our national economy."" The Act purports to promote
"family reunification" and to offer "a haven for the homeless, the
fearful, and the oppressed of the world."12
Although the national policies enunciated may be desirable, ap-
plication of the Act often has tragic consequences when individ-
ual applicants are excluded.
In terms of human misery, the potential impact of our immigration laws
can hardly be overstated .... [TJhe immigration laws operate directly
7. See id. at 97-141.
8. See id. at 142-61.
9. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (West 1970 & Supp. 1978).
10.
In addition to an immigration statute of 173 pages,... there are 185 pages
of immigration regulations, . . . and 66 pages of visa regulations. In
addition, a comprehensive review of the subject requires reference to
thousands of pages of... [the] Foreign Affairs Manual of the State De-
partment, 13 volumes of Administrative Decisions ... and several hun-
dred Interim Decisions.
Wasserman, Grounds and Procedures Relating to Deportation, 13 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 125, 125-26 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
11. S. KANSAS, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONAIrY AcT ANNOTATED 24 (1953).
12. Rodino, Foreword, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. i, i-i (1975).
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and exclusively on human beings, flesh and blood, men, women and chil-
dren, whose hopes for future happiness in a realistic sense frequently de-
pend on their ability to enter, or remain in, this land of freedom and
opportunity.
1 3
Such potential for hardship has led to the promulgation of ever-
increasing avenues of relief from the Act's application.14 Some
provisions for relief are embodied in the statute itself, while per-
sonal interpretations of the Act and individual judgments of vari-
ous decisionmakers can afford other relief. Each form of relief
has a common grain: The decisionmaker must exercise an ele-
ment of administrative discretion to benefit the alien.15
The Act contains a number of exclusionary provisions.16 Two of
these provisions in which the authors believed discretionary
power to exist were investigated in depth. One provision provides
for denial of a visa application if the consular officer believes an
alien is likely to become a public charge.'? The other provision
provides for visa denial if the alien presents insufficient documen-
tary evidence.18 This Study hypothesized that individual consular
officers' different interpretations of the Act, regulations promul-
gated pursuant to it, and other interpretative materials would
lead to inconsistent results in the issuance of immigrant visas.
That in 1975 these two provisions accounted for approximately
ninety-five percent of all visa denials19 evidences the importance
of controlling discretion under them.
This Study outlines the factors affecting a consular officer's de-
cision and considers the proper role of discretion in the issuance
or denial of immigrant visas. Recommendations for the control
and structuring of existing discretionary power follow this analy-
sis.
13. Roberts, The Exercise of Administrative Discretion Under the Immigration
Laws, 13 SAN DIEGO L REV. 144, 144 (1975).
14. The statute provides waivers of exclusion for certain individuals. Immigra-
tion & Nationality Act § 212(g)-(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(g)-(i) (1976) [the Immigration
and Nationality Act is hereinafter cited as I. & N. Act].
15. Roberts, The Exercise of Administrative Discretion Under the Immigration
Laws, 13 SAN DIEGO L REV. 144, 146 (1975).
16. L & N. Act § 212(a)(1)-(32), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(1)-(32) (West 1970 & Supp.
1978).
17. Id. § 212(a) (15), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (15) (1976).
18. Id. § 221(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g) (1976).
19. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, REPORT OF THE VISA OFFICE 76 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as VISA OFFICE REPORT].
METHODOLOGY
The authors conducted the research for this Study by using a
multi-method approach, rare in traditional legal analysis.2 0 First,
the authors examined the relevant exclusionary provisions of the
Act and the regulations. Second, several hypotheses were tested
empirically through the use of a questionnaire sent to consular of-
ficers throughout the world. Third, intensive interviewing and ob-
servation of consular officers in the field allowed an assembly of
data concerning personal behavior and impressions.
The research was initiated by mailing questionnaires to approx-
imately 360 consular officers worldwide.2 1 The questionnaire was
designed to elicit the following information: (1) whether specified
subjective factors, such as the appearance or the demeanor of an
applicant, influence a consular officer's decision to grant or deny a
visa;22 (2) whether a correlation exists between officer workload
and favorable application decisions; 23 (3) what factors influence
an officer's decision of eligibility under the public charge provi-
sion;24 (4) the effect, if any, of experience or education upon the
visa-issuing process;25 (5) what guidelines or materials the consu-
lar officer consults in making his determination;2 6 and (6) what
type of review of the consular officer's decision is available and
whether it is used in practice.2
7
The questionnaire consisted both of objective questions limiting
the officer to one of several alternative responses 28 and of open-
20. The National Science Foundation believed that traditional legal research
would benefit from the application of social science research methods. The re-
searchers attended a four-day training seminar in statistical research methods
sponsored by the National Science Foundation in Madison, Wisconsin. Professors
Richard Abel of the University of California, Los Angeles, and Stewart Macaulay
of the University of Wisconsin, Madison, greatly aided the authors in preparing
the strategy both for the use of the questionnaires and in interviewing techniques.
21. The final version of the questionnaire is printed as Appendix A. The ques-
tionnaire was revised once after the conference in Wisconsin, see note 20 supra,
again upon the advice of members of the State Department's Visa Office, and once
again upon the advice of Dr. Richard Hofstetter, computer analysis advisor for this
Study. The authors mailed questionnaires to consular officers in July and August,
1977.
The questionnaires were sent to each consular officer at each immigrant visa-is-
suing post worldwide. However, because the Visa Office of the State Department
could not state the number of immigrant visa-issuing officers assigned to each
post, there is no way of declaring with certainty the percentage of response.
22. See Appendix A, questions 4, 6-7.
23. See id. questions 2-3.
24. See id. questions 8 & 9; L & N. Act § 212(a) (15), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (15)
(1976).
25. See Appendix A, question 16.
26. See id. questions 11-12.
27. See id. questions 14-15.
28. See id. questions 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 11-16.
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ended questions allowing the officer to elaborate. 29 Upon receipt
of completed questionnaires, researchers examined the answers
to the open-ended questions and assigned corresponding numeri-
cal values to similar answers for purposes of computer analysis.
The objective questions were similarly coded. Researchers
designed a computer program to provide frequency statistics on
each question and to allow cross-tabulation of variables to deter-
mine whether any significant trend resulted.3 0 For example, the
computer program correlated the length of time each officer had
spent in the Foreign Service with his response to the question
identifying his major problems as an immigrant visa officer. As a
result, the authors could determine whether any significant differ-
ences in the perception of major problems existed between newer
officers and those with more experience.
To complement the statistics produced by the questionnaires,
the authors conducted intensive personal interviews with immi-
grant visa-issuing officers in Foreign Service offices throughout
Canada and Mexico. During the months of July and August, 1977,
one author observed and interviewed officers at Canadian offices
in Halifax, Montreal, Toronto, Winnipeg, and Vancouver.31 Simul-
taneously, the other author visited Mexican posts in Ciudad Jua-
rez, Monterrey, Mexico City, Guadalajara, and Tijuana.
32
In addition to participating in personal interviews, the consular
officers at each office visited permitted the authors to observe of-
fice procedure and visa-application interviews. Although the au-
thors believed the questionnaire results would be useful for
29. See id. questions 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, 15(h)-(j).
30. The computer program is entitled Statistical Package for the Social
Sciences and was developed by Dr. Richard Hofstetter and personnel at the Social
Science Research Laboratory at San Diego State University. The authors would
like to thank those who helped with the preparation of the questionnaire for com-
puter analysis and with the interpretation of the results after the questionnaires
were coded and analyzed.
31. The offices in Canada were observed as follows: Halifax, July 8-12; Mon-
treal, July 14-20; Toronto, July 22-28; Winnipeg, Aug. 3-5; and Vancouver, Aug. 8-10.
32. The offices in Mexico were observed as follows: Ciudad Juarez, July 8-14;
Monterrey, July 18-22; Mexico City, July 24-Aug. 2; Guadalajara, Aug. 8-12; and Ti-
juana, July 7-Aug. 5. Members of the Visa Office of the State Department were
helpful to the authors throughout the preparation of this Study. Messrs. William
Morgan, Carl Shepherd, Marvin Groeneweg, and Ms. Murrow Morris spent several
days briefing the authors on the applicable law and procedure for the issuance of
visas. Mr. Morgan of the Visa Office also sent a telegram to all Foreign Service
posts stating that the project had State Department approval and encouraging co-
operation of the consular officers.
general comparisons on a worldwide basis, they also believed that
more honest, accurate, and thoughtful information could be ob-
tained through the observation of personal contact in the field.
33
The Visa Office of the United States Department of State sup-
plied the authors with a third source of data, consisting of infor-
mation concerning consular officers and visa statistics. The Visa
Office also provided the authors with copies of guidelines and
materials used by consular officers in the field.
With the multi-method strategy, the strengths of each approach
buttress the weaknesses of the others. The questionnaire pro-
vides systematic worldwide coverage, but it retains the weak-
nesses of an unknown response rate and of the authors' inability
to control the situations in which it was administered. The inter-
views in Mexico and in Canada, although providing a comprehen-
sive survey of all officers within the two countries, could be
atypical for immigrant-visa purposes because of the proximity of
these two countries to the United States. Information from the
State Department is useful because it is based on experience,
personal knowledge, and statistics, but one must examine it criti-
cally because the Visa Office's interest in its officers may have re-
sulted in biased observations.
THE CONSULAR OFFICER'S ROLE IN THE VisA-APPUCATIoN PROCESS
Congress has delegated various aspects of the immigration
laws' administration to the State Department and to the Justice
Department. As a result, agents of the two departments must
work together in close harmony to ensure that the law is ade-
quately enforced.
Congress has delegated supervision of alien entry into the
United States and enforcement of the Act to the Attorney Gen-
eral34 and upon his delegation to the Commissioner of the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service (INS).35 The execution of the
Act is committed to various officials under authority of the Com-
missioner.36 The INS ascertains the right of each alien to reside
in the United States. This job includes eliminating undesirable
aliens at the port of entry,37 approving visa petitions filed by rela-
33. To avoid possible bias resulting from interviewing only officers and em-
ployees of the State Department, the authors also solicited the views of several
immigration attorneys.
34. I. & N. Act § 103(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1976).
35. Id. § 103(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(b).
36. 8 C.F.R. pt. 2 (1978).
37. Aliens who have no right to enter the United States or whose entry would
not be in the best interest of the United States are considered undesirables.
[1975] INS ANN. REP. 2. See Roberts, The Exercise of Administrative Discretion
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tives of applicants, deciding whether to prosecute an alien, and
deciding whether to grant relief from deportation. All these func-
tions involve elements of discretionary decisionmaking.3 8
The Department of State is responsible for administration of
the immigration laws abroad. The Bureau of Security and Consu-
lar Affairs within the Department of State is under the direct
jurisdiction of the Deputy Undersecretary of State for Administra-
tion. The INS Commissioner and the Undersecretary maintain
continuous liaison to ensure coordinated, uniform, and efficient
administration of the Act and of all other immigration and nation-
ality laws.39
Within the Bureau of Consular Affairs is the Visa Office. The
Visa Office's main responsibility is to ensure proper and efficient
issuance of visas at overseas Foreign Service posts. With few ex-
ceptions, each alien who desires to visit or to immigrate to the
United States must obtain a visa from a United States consular
officer stationed at an appropriate Foreign Service post abroad.40
The consular officers who issue the visas are directly under the
authority of the Visa Office, which trains the officers, 4 1 continu-
ally instructs them in the Act's interpretation, provides advisory
Under the Immigration Laws, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 144 (1975). Mr. Roberts has
well-summarized the results and the effects of discretion as exercised by the INS:
In the absence of carefully considered and clearly articulated standards
for the exercise of the various types of discretionary powers, the resulting
decisions must necessarily vary with the personal attitudes and biases of
the individual decisionmakers. Adjudicators with hard-nosed outlooks are
likely to be more conservative in their evidentiary appraisals and in their
dispensation of discretionary bounties than their counterparts with more
permissive philosophies.
Id. at 147-48.
38. Roberts, The Exercise of Administrative Discretion Under the Immigration
Laws, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 144, 147-48 (1975).
39. Jurisdiction of the State and Justice Departments is complementary in
most respects although in certain instances a duplication of effort appears to exist.
See note 66 infra. INS officers are often stationed at a number of Foreign Service
posts abroad to carry out certain functions that come within their responsibility.
40. L & N. Act § 101(a) (16), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (16) (1976). Lawful residents and
aliens returning to the United States may qualify for an adjustment of status, a
procedure for entry in lieu of the visa requirement.
41. The Department has recently opened its Rosslyn training center in Arling-
ton, Virginia. The immigrant visa portion of this six-week program includes inten-
sive study of the statute and regulations, frequent testing, the use of a Self-
Instructional Study Guide that includes factual hypothetical situations for the of-
ficer's analysis, and frequent role-playing between experienced consular officers
and the trainees simulating the immigrant-visa interview. Interview with John
Coffman, Program Director, in Arlington, Virginia (June 12, 1977).
opinions upon request, and prepares regulations42 concerning all
phases of the issuance of immigrant and non-immigrant visas.
The consular officer's position is the most powerful of any offi-
cial in the Visa Office. He makes the initial and the final determi-
nation on whether a visa will be granted. These actions can have
a significant effect on the alien who is applying for permission to
reside in or to visit the United States. If the consular officer re-
fuses to issue a non-immigrant visa, the alien merely foregoes the
chance to visit the United States. 43 In contrast, when the consular
officer denies an immigrant visa, the applicant foregoes the oppor-
tunity to live in the United States and might be forced to remain
apart from family and loved ones. Because of the harsher effect
of an immigrant visa denial, more stringent guidelines have been
enacted for that situation than for the denial of a non-immigrant
visa.44 In both instances, however, elements of discretion persist.
The consular officer exercises discretionary power in deciding
whether any of the thirty-two grounds for excluding an immigrant
visa application apply to a particular case.4 5 If the officer con-
42. These regulations are promulgated by the Secretary of State and imple-
ment the immigration laws. The regulations are published at 22 C.F.R. § 42 and in
the Federal Register.
43. Any immigrant (with the exception of Canadians) desiring temporary ad-
mission to the United States must obtain a non-immigrant visa from an American
consular officer. See I. & N. Act § 101, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 (West 1970 & Supp. 1978)
(regulates the issuance of non-immigrant visas). The Act recognizes that a dis-
tinction may be made between immigrants and non-immigrants in the application
of certain exclusionary provisions. Non-immigrating aliens are granted only tem-
porary admission. Subjecting such aliens to some of the grounds for exclusion is
not only unnecessary for the protection of the interests of the United States but
would needlessly restrict the free travel of aliens. See S. KANSAS, IAMUGRATION
AND NATioNALrry AcT ANNOTATED (1953) for an informative discussion of the Act's
more lenient provisions applicable to non-immigrant visa applicants.
44. See generally 22 C.F.R. § 42 (1977).
45. L & N. Act § 212(a) (1)-(32), 8 U.S.C.A. §1182(a) (l)-(32) (West 1970 & Supp.
1978). These provisions exclude aliens on grounds of health, morality, criminal
convictions, political activities, and economics. That discretionary authority exists
is evidenced by consular officers' inconsistent opinions on the subject. One consu-
lar officer at Halifax, Canada, believes that no discretion exists in the immigrant
visa process. If an alien shows the proper documentation, this officer believes that
a visa should be issued. The officer prefers immigrant visa work to non-immigrant
visa work because the former is more regulated and because if an officer need
make neither discretionary decisions nor value judgments, he cannot be con-
demned for a wrong decision. Interview with consular officer at the United States
consulate in Halifax, Canada (July 7, 1977). On the other hand, in Toronto, Ca-
nada, it is the opinion of the vice-consul that a great deal of discretion is involved.
The law is so vague that whenever the law does not state "you must" or "you must
not," the consular officer uses his discretion to issue or deny the visa. Even if the
law does state "you must" or "you must not," a savings clause may negate the ab-
solute language. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in
Toronto, Canada (July 25, 1977). One immigration attorney believes that when an
officer makes a decision regarding certain exclusionary provisions of the Act, "the
discretion, attitude, perspective, call it what you will, of the Consul is the deter-
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cludes that the alien falls within one of the thirty-two categories,
the visa application must be denied.46 No judicial review of the
officer's decision is available to the alien, and in most cases, the
officer's opinion has the effect of a final determination.47
Although limited discretion exists to refuse a visa, the consular
officer utilizes broader discretion to issue a questionable or bor-
derline visa.8 It takes considerably more time and paperwork to
deny a visa than to issue one, and the Visa Office looks upon nu-
merous denials with disfavor. Moreover, visa issuances are sel-
dom, if ever, reviewed 4 9 Consequently, in questionable cases a
consular officer may issue visas to avoid excess work or the disap-
mining factor." Letter from William B. Taffet to Kim R. Anderson (Oct. 31, 1977)
(on fie with the San Diego Law Review). Such varying views of discretion lead to
the conclusion that each consular officer defines his own limits of discretion within
the law and exercises his authority within the confines of that definition.
46. The Act provides that all those who fall within a class of excludable aliens
"shall be ineligible to receive visas." L & N. Act § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1976).
In a separate provision, the Act states that no visa shall be issued if it appears to
the consular officer that the applicant is ineligible to receive a visa under the
thirty-two grounds of exclusion. Id. § 221(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g).
The issuance of the visa is further subject to quantitative restrictions that the
alien must overcome to immigrate. A bill recently signed into law has replaced
the prior discriminatory quotas, which established numerical limits by hemi-
spheres, allotting 170,000 to the Western Hemisphere and 120,000 to the Eastern
Hemisphere. The new measure allows a worldwide ceiling of 290,000 and helps to
eliminate discrimination based upon place of birth or residence. Act of Oct. 5,
1978, Pub. L No. 95-412, 92 Stat. 907 (amending 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1153 (1976)). The
quota is exclusive of immediate relatives and of special preferred immigrants. Im-
mediate relatives are defined as the "children, spouses, and parents of a citizen of
the United States." 1. & N. Act § 201(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1976). Special pre-
ferred immigrants include those who are ministers of religion, former citizens of
the United States, and United States government employees. Id. § 101(a) (15), 8
U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (15) (1976). In addition to the numerical maximums, the immigra-
tion law imposes a ceiling of 20,000 immigrants per year from each country within
either hemisphere. Id. § 202(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) (1976) (Eastern Hemisphere).
The Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. 94-571, § 3, 90
Stat. 2703 (amending I. & N. Act § 202(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1152(c) (1976)), extend this
requirement to countries of the Western Hemisphere.
47. On the limitations of administrative review, see notes 156-70 and accompa-
nying text infra.
48. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Toronto,
Canada (July 22, 1977). According to this officer discretion is exercised whenever
a visa is issued. This officer believes that he uses his discretion to issue many
visas that would be denied by other officers at his post.
49. The exception to the non-reviewability of issued visas is the second deter-
mination at the border by the INS. It has been suggested that a process of review
of these issued visas be investigated. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE U.S.,
NEED TO REDUCE PUBLIC ExPENDITuRES FOR NEWLY ARRIVED IMMIGRANTS AND COR-
RECT INEQUITY IN CURRENT IMMIGRATION LAW, REPORT TO CONGRESS 29-32 (1975).
However, others believe that the man-hours and funds required to undertake such
proval of his superiors.50
Although the consular officer is directly responsible for issuing
or denying visas, each Foreign Service office employs many local
employees who contribute significantly to the visa decision.51 For
example, local employees often are delegated the routine tasks of
ascertaining whether the applicant falls within his country's
quota52 or of answering congressional inquiries regarding the sta-
tus of certain applications. However, in some instances local em-
ployees have effective power to deny a visa by failing to grant
discretionary jurisdiction to hear a case 53 or by causing a "quasi-
refusal" for lack of documentation. 54
Before the would-be immigrant receives an appointment for an
interview with a consular officer, the applicant must follow a time-
a review render it impracticable. Interview with consular officer at the United
States consulate in Montreal, Canada (July 14, 1977).
50. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Toronto,
Canada (July 22, 1977).
51. These local employees are nationals of the State in which the Foreign
Service office is located.
52. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Winnipeg,
Canada (Aug. 2, 1977).
53. At one consulate in Canada a local employee has the job of screening ap-
plications for hearing. Although the Canadian posts accept "stateside" cases
(those involving aliens residing in the United States) when immediate relatives
are involved, consular officers can exercise their discretion to accept cases involv-
ing more distant relatives. When one of the authors was in this consulate, a local
employee denied a hearing to a fifth preference petition (brother or sister) sup-
ported by a congressional inquiry. She stated that to grant jurisdiction would only
open "Pandora's box" and "flood" the office with applicants. The decision caused
the applicant to return to her native country (China) to obtain the visa.
According to William B. Taffet, a former immigration judge for the Justice De-
partment, this Canadian office had no jurisdiction to accept other than first or sec-
ond preference stateside cases and acceptance of this fifth preference case was
beyond the consulate's jurisdiction. Letter from William B. Taffet to Paula L. Leh-
mann (Aug. 15, 1978) (on file with the San Diego Law Review).
54. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Winnipeg,
Canada (Aug. 2, 1977). In Winnipeg, a local employee was in effect making deci-
sions whether prospective immigrants provided evidence sufficient to show they
would not be public charges. See L & N. Act § 212(a) (15), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (15)
(1976). If an alien could not document his application to the employee's satisfac-
tion, he was informed that he could not immigrate. These applicants neither en-
tered the consulate nor were interviewed by a consular officer. Thus, the Visa
Office's statistics did not include their "refusals." If an alien advanced to the inter-
view stage, he almost certainly would obtain his visa.
The extremely low rate of refusals at the Winnipeg post illustrates the effective-
ness of this process. However, the Visa Office halted the pre-screening of appli-
cants in 1977. The effects of the change in procedure should be seen in an increase
in refusals at this post because applicants will come for their interviews without
prior review of their documents. The halting of the pre-screening process may
also lead to the inconvenience of a second trip for the applicant if his visa is re-
fused on his first visit. Interview with consular officer at the United States consu-
late in Winnipeg, Canada (Aug. 2, 1977).
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consuming application procedure.55 Upon completion of a prelim-
inary questionnaire, 56 the consulate staff informs the alien of any
preliminary requirements needed to comply with the numerical
restrictions on immigration. For example, certain relatives re-
ceive priority under the preference system.5 7 At this point, the
consulate staff informs the applicant whether he may apply for
preferred status under the preference system and if so, which
visa petitions verifying the claimed relationship he should ffle.5 8
In addition, certain applicants must apply to the Department of
Labor for a labor certification.59
After establishing his status and filing the appropriate petitions,
the alien is informed of the documents he must assemble to file
55. For an overview of the immigration procedure, see Comment, How to Im-
migrate to the United States: A Practical Guide for the Attorney, 14 SAN DIGO L
REV. 193 (1976).
56. Form OF-222, 22 C.F.R. § 42.115(a) (1977).
57. If an immigrant does not qualify as an immediate relative or a special im-
migrant, he may be issued a visa under the preference system on a first-come,
first-served basis. The Act delineates seven preference categories for worldwide
immigrants. L & N. Act § 203(a) (1)-(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (1)-(7) (1976). The Immi-
gration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L 94-571, §§ 2, 4, 90 Stat.
2703 (amending I. & N. Act §§ 201, 203, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1153 (1970)), extend to the
Western Hemisphere the preference system previously applicable only to the
Eastern Hemisphere. In order of preference, the categories include: (1) unmarried
sons and daughters over 21 years of age of United States citizens; (2) spouses and
unmarried sons and daughters of aliens lawfully admitted for permanent resi-
dence; (3) members of the professions or persons of exceptional ability in the sci-
ences and arts; (4) married sons and daughters of United States citizens; (5)
brothers and sisters of United States citizens, provided such citizens are at least
21 years of age; (6) skilled and unskilled workers in short supply in the United
States; (7) refugees, non-preference-other immigrants; numbers available for ap-
plicants not used by the other seven preference categories. For specific percent-
ages of the total number of visas allocated to each preference category, see L & N.
Act § 203(a)(1)-(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1)-(7) (1976).
58. An applicant may not obtain preferred status as a relative of a United
States citizen or resident alien unless that relative files an INS petition on the ap-
plicant's behalf The INS is responsible for verifying the claimed relationship. Af-
ter the INS has approved the petition, it is sent to a consular officer who then
determines whether to issue a visa. See Comment, How to Immigrate to the
United States: A Practical Guide for the Attorney, 14 SAN DIEGO L REV. 193, 213-15
(1976).
59. The act excludes from admission any alien intending to perform skilled or
unskilled labor unless he receives exempt status. I. & N. Act § 212(a) (14), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a) (14) (1976). See Rubin & Mancini, An Overview of the Labor Certification
Requirement for Intending Immigrants, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 76 (1976). The 1976
amendment to the Act extended the exemptions to this requirement by making
the Western Hemisphere exemptions the same as the Eastern Hemisphere ex-
emptions. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. 94-571, §
5, 90 Stat. 2703 (amending I. &N. Act § 212(a) (14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (14) (1970)).
with the visa application. 60 The consular office assesses whether
a visa number is available under the numerical limitations and, if
one is not available, how long the applicant must wait for an
opening. When the applicant has notified the consular office that
he has obtained all the required documents, he receives a formal
application and an appointment for an interview with the consu-
lar officer.61 At the appointed time a local employee of the consu-
lar office screens the accumulated documents, fills in available
information, and prepares the papers for review by the consular
officer.
62
After what may be months of preparation, the applicant is
ready for his initial encounter with a United States consular of-
ficer. The interview is normally short and routine.63 The consular
officer examines the documentation to ensure that the alien is not
excludable under one of the thirty-two grounds enumerated in
the Act.64 If the consular officer is satisfied that the applicant is
not excludable, the applicant swears to the accuracy of the peti-
tion and/or application. The visa is then issued upon the pay-
ment of a fee,65 and the alien and his family have four months
60. The Act lists the documents the alien must file with the visa application. I.
&N. Act § 222(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1202(b) (1976). See 22 C.F.R. § 42.111(b) (1977). These
documents include a police certificate from the appropriate authorities in all areas
in which the applicant has resided for over six months since the age of 16, military
or prison records, and an original birth record. Although not statutorily mandated,
a consular officer may require the alien to produce a marriage certificate, a divorce
certificate, or other documents that the consular officer deems necessary to verify
an applicant's relationship to a spouse or children or identity. See id. §
42.111(b) (5).
61. The formal application is executed on Form OF-230. 22 C.F.R. § 42.115(b)
(1977). The alien then receives a formal appointment, scheduled months in ad-
vance because of large demand. In Toronto, consular officers interview as many as
75 applicants daily. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate
in Toronto, Canada (July 22, 1977).
62. Often the local employee who examines the papers will note on the appli-
cation whether documents are missing or suspicious. This preliminary review of
the documents is a great help to the consular officer, who usually has time only for
a cursory examination. One of the authors observed this procedure in Winnipeg
and in Vancouver, Canada.
63. The average interview lasts five to 10 minutes. Most consular officers think
that by the time the application reaches the interviewing stage, issuance of a visa
is normally routine. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate
in Halifax, Canada (July 8, 1977). One officer estimated that 13% of the cases are
decided at the interview stage. Interview with consular officer at the United States
consulate in Montreal, Canada (July 20, 1977). Another officer believes that in five
percent of the cases, visas are issued or refused based upon the consular officer's
impression of an applicant during the interview. Interview with consular officer at
the United States consulate in Montreal, Canada (July 20, 1977).
64. See I. & N. Act § 212(a) (1)-(32), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a) (1)-(32) (West 1970 &
Supp. 1978).
65. The visa fee is $20, in addition to a five-dollar fee for the visa application.
22 C.F.R. § 42.121 (1977).
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from that date to enter the United States.
66
If the consular officer finds the alien to be excludable by the
provisions of the Act, a different procedure results. The officer
must document all permanent refusals. The consular officer for-
wards these documents to the post's principal consular officer for
review. 67 In addition, the State Department informally reviews a
visa denial if requested to do so by an attorney, a Member of Con-
gress, or an interested party.63 Upon a finding of error, the Visa
Office will issue an advisory opinion to the consular officer. The
advisory opinion considers all the facts and advises the officer
whether to issue the visa. The opinion is binding on conclusions
of law but not on conclusions of fact. However, consular officers
generally comply with the opinion.
69
Although an applicant may be denied a visa by the consular of-
ficer on grounds of prostitution or criminal conviction,70 on
grounds of fraud in seeking entry,71 or on certain medical
grounds,72 the INS frequently grants waivers of excludability to
immediate relatives of United States citizens.73 Consular officers
disfavor these provisions because they defeat the impartial appli-
cation of the Act's exclusionary provisions.74
66. I. & N. Act § 221(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (1976). The alien has one final obsta-
cle to overcome, for even an alien with a valid visa may still be determined inad-
missible by an immigration officer at the border. The consular officer's decision to
grant a visa is not binding on the border officer, who is empowered to make an
independent determination of the alien's qualifications and documentation.
67. 22 C.F.R. § 42.130(b) (1977).
68. Id. § 42.130(b), (c). See 1 C. GORDON & EL ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW
AND PROCEDURE § 3.11b, at 3-71 (rev. ed. 1977).
69. 22 C.F.R. § 42.130(b), (c) (1977).
70. L & N. Act § 212(a) (10), (12), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (10), (12) (1976).
71. Id. § 212(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i).
72. Id. § 212(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(g).
73. Id. § 212(h)-(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)-(i).
74. Many officers believe that denying a visa that will receive a routine waiver
wastes time and effort. Interview with consular officer at the United States consu-
late in Toronto, Canada (July 25, 1977). An alien who is denied a visa by a consu-
lar officer or a waiver by the INS may in rare instances obtain admission through
congressional passage of a private bill. This procedure requires the alien to peti-
tion Congress to enact a private bill waiving his admissibility deficiencies. Con-
gress infrequently enacts these bills; the alien must usually demonstrate
compelling equities. The 90th Congress enacted into law only 218 of the 7,293 pri-
vate immigration and nationality bills introduced. See [19741 INS ANN. REP. 132
(table 55).
CONSULAR DISCRETIONARY AUTHORIT UNDER THE REGULATORY
SCHEME AND IN PRACTICE
This section examines the extent to which the existing reg-
ulatory scheme minimizes the consular officer's discretionary
authority to issue or refuse immigrant visas. The Act, the regula-
tions promulgated under it, and the Department of State's poli-
cies, guidelines, and review procedures embody official efforts to
minimize consular officer discretionary authority. These rules
and regulations function as the equivalent of the three means of
minimizing discretion that Professor Davis has identifled.75 Thus
the Act, regulations, policies, guidelines, and official review proce-
dures attempt to confine, structure, and check consular officer dis-
cretionary authority.
Discretion is confined by fixing boundaries around it.76 The Act
and regulations confine a consular officer's discretion whenever
they establish the limits of his authority-that is, the acceptable
grounds for refusal to issue a visa. Structuring discretion
organizes or orders this authority.7 V The regulatory scheme
structures a consular officer's discretion whenever the scheme es-
tablishes and weighs factors meriting consideration in a determi-
nation. Checking discretion means review of an officer's
decisions.7 8 The regulatory scheme checks a consular officer's
discretion whenever the scheme provides for review of his deter-
minations.
The first step in this analysis is to identify the general provi-
sions of the regulatory scheme that delimit consular authority.
The second step is to examine specific grounds of ineligibility for
the tendency to confine, structure, or check consular discretion.
The authors compare their observations of officers' day-to-day ex-
ercise of authority with the grants of authority under the Act's
general provisions and under its specific grounds of ineligibility.
These observations are based on interviews with consular officers
in Mexico and Canada7 9 as well as on the responses to the ques-
tionnaires the authors distributed to all immigrant visa-issuing of-
ficers worldwide.8 0 These comparisons indicate whether consular
officers comply with or exceed the grant of authority under each
provision of the regulatory scheme.
75. See notes 5-8 and accompanying text supra.
76. Id.
77. K. DAvis, ADmNSTRATrVE LAw TEXT 93-94 (3d ed. 1972).
78. Id. at 107.
79. See notes 31-32 and accompanying text supra.
80. See notes 21-30 and accompanying text supra.
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General Provisions Delimiting Consular Discretion
Refusal Authority
Section 221(g) of the Act sets forth the broad limits of consular
authority to refuse immigrant visas. The acceptable grounds of
refusals are confined to cases within the thirty-two specific statu-
tory grounds of ineligibility, other law, or regulations issued
under the Act.81 The statutory standard of refusal requires that
the consular officer "know or have reason to believe" that an alien
is ineligible for a visa.82 The applicant bears the burden of prov-
ing his eligibility for an immigrant visa.83
Departmental regulations somewhat clarify this statutory lan-
guage. The "reason to believe" standard requires a "determina-
tion based upon facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonable person to conclude that the applicant is ineligible to
receive an immigrant visa" under the Act and the regulations.
84
The same regulation provides that consideration "shall" be given
to any evidence submitted to overcome a prior refusal.85
Procedurally, consular officers must document and inform the
applicant of the reasons for refusal and of the availability of any
administrative relief.86 Further, the Visa Office has adopted a pol-
icy that requires consular officers to inform the applicant's attor-
ney of record of the basis for the refusal.8 7 This policy means that
an officer must cite as a reason for refusal a specific ground of in-
eligibility under sections 212(a) (1)-(32) or 221(g) of the Act or
under other law.
Thus, section 221(g) only minimally confines consular authority
to refuse immigrant visas. Basically, a consular officer may refuse
a visa after an examination of the facts presented by the applicant
if he has reason to believe the alien is ineligible under the law. In
81. L & N. Act § 221(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g) (1976).
82. Id.
83. Id. § 291, 8 U.S.C. § 1361.
84. 22 C.F.R. § 42.90 (1977).
85. Id.
86. Id. § 42.130(a).
87. Airgram from the Department of State to all American Diplomatic and
Consular Posts (except Chiang Mai) and the District Administrators of the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands, the Governor of American Samoa, and the Execu-
tive Secretary of the Canal Zone, Message Ref. No. A-4660, at 2, n.3 (Nov. 14, 1977)
(on file with the San Diego Law Review).
practice, consular authority under section 221(g) is virtually de-
void of confinement or structure.
Section 221(g) is the most frequently cited basis for visa refus-
als.88 In 1975, section 221(g) accounted for fifty-one percent of all
initial refusals.8 9 Typically, a refusal under this section means
that the application contains "insufficient documentation" of eligi-
bility. In fact, section 221(g) serves as a catch-all, covering a mul-
titude of deficiencies that may be too difficult to document under
a specific ground of ineligibility.90 In one case, for example, the
applicant presented a full complement of required documents,
but the consular officer suspected that one of the documents was
fraudulent. Rather than refuse to issue the visa on the ground of
fraud, the consular officer refused for insufficient documentation
under section 221(g).91 Presentation of church certificates of mar-
riage or baptism instead of civil certificates also can result in a re-
fusal for insufficient documentation. 92
A refusal for insufficient documentation effectively delays issu-
ance of a visa pending presentation of additional evidence.93 If an
applicant is unable to obtain the requested documents, the visa is
denied indefinitely.94 However, a consular officer at the Toronto
post believes that the delay caused by a refusal for insufficient
documentation is a waste of time and energy.95 If he expects the
alien to be able to secure the requested document, he does not
bother to refuse.96
The regulations provide for waiver of required documents on
the ground of undue hardship.97 Circumstances constituting un-
due hardship are of great variety. A consular officer in Toronto,
Canada, finds undue hardship when an applicant must leave the
province to obtain the document.98 Another officer waives docu-
mentation upon a showing that the applicant tried but failed to
88. VISA OFFICE REPORT, supra note 19, at 76.
89. Id. This figure does not take into account refusals later overcome by the
presentation of additional evidence of eligibility to immigrate. When refusals
overcome are included, § 221(g) accounts for approximately 41% of all refusals.
Id.
90. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Monter-
rey, Mexico (July 20, 1977).
91. Id.
92. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Toronto,
Canada (July 22, 1977).
93. 22 C.F. § 42.90 (1977).
94. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Toronto,
Canada (July 25, 1977).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 22 C.F.R. § 42.111(c) (1977).
98. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Toronto,
Canada (July 20, 1977).
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obtain the document.99
On the one hand, consular officers and their staffs acknowledge
that section 221(g) poses a considerable threat of refusal by ca-
price. An officer at the Monterrey, Mexico, post admitted that "by
going by the book" consular officers could force indefinite de-
lay.100 Sometimes section 221(g) refusals are treated as "soft re-
fusals," neither documented nor submitted for administrative
review. 0 1 Two staff members at the consulate in Vancouver, Ca-
nada, stated that an officer could refuse to issue a visa under sec-
tion 221(g) merely by writing "pending investigation" on the
refusal sheet. 0 2
On the other hand, consular officers almost always comply with
regulations allowing applicants to submit new evidence to over-
come a prior refusal. 0 3 In 1975, applicants overcame section
221(g) refusals fully sixty percent of the time. 0 4 Moreover, in
Mexico consular officers document virtually all refusals and in-
form the applicant of the reasons. Compliance with this last re-
quirement is remarkable for its thoroughness.OS Sometimes the
exchange between the visa officer and applicant about what must
be done to overcome a refusal is lengthier than the initial inter-
view itself.106 Similarly, the Vancouver, Canada, office has estab-
99. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Montreal,
Canada (July 14, 1977).
100. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Monter-
rey, Mexico (July 19, 1977).
101. This situation existed in Winnipeg, Canada in all cases of "pre-screening,"
or cases in which the applicant does not receive an interview until the reviewing
staff person is satisfied that all his documents are in order. See note 53 supra. In-
terview with staff member at the United States consulate in Winnipeg, Canada
(Aug. 4, 1977).
102. Interview with staff member at the United States consulate in Vancouver,
Canada (Aug. 8, 1977). This person reported that one consular officer refused visas
for insufficient documentation under § 221(g) if the applicant declined to transfer
all bank accounts to the United States, regardless of the amount of the assets in-
volved.
103. VISA OFFICE REPORT, supra note 19, at 76. This report indicates that of the
total number of visas refused on all grounds in 1975, almost one-half were later
overcome and the visas issued.
104. Id.
105. One author observed numerous interviews between applicants and consu-
lar officers at the United States consulates in Monterrey, Mexico City, and Guada-
lajara, Mexico.
106. In one case, a consular officer in Guadalajara, Mexico, halted an appli-
cant's interview to bring in a citizenship officer to clarify the law to the applicant.
Interview with consul and visa applicant witnessed at the United States consulate
in Guadalajara, Mexico (Aug. 9, 1977).
lished a particularly effective method of processing requests to
overcome section 221(g) refusals that saves time and avoids the
inconvenience of a second interview with the often overloaded of-
ficer. 0 7
The question remains whether consular officers comply with or
exceed the grant of authority in section 221(g). Officers argue
that the grant of authority is broad enough to include almost any
refusals. As indicated earlier, however, section 221(g) has been
interpreted to require a "reasonable person" or objective standard
of refusal. However, the reasonable person standard of visa refus-
als is largely devoid of meaning. As noted above, consular officers
in at least a few posts can choose to disbelieve an applicant's
profferred evidence and exercise "soft refusals"--neither docu-
mented nor reviewed. Officers in other posts may waive required
documents and issue visas according to their own interpretations
of "undue hardship." In other cases, as in the example in which
the consul suspected but could not prove fraud, section 221(g)
functions as a catch-all refusal category. Certainly, then, "soft re-
fusals" that escape scrutiny for reasonableness exceed the consu-
lar officer's grant of authority.
Whether other refusals meet the reasonableness standard and
comply with the grant of authority under section 221(g) depends
upon the quality of review. In other fields of law courts determine
the issue of reasonableness. A consular's officers decision
whether to issue an immigrant visa is not subject to judicial re-
view.108 Generally, however, an officer's visa refusal is subject to a
certain amount of administrative review. 0 9
Administrative Review of Immigrant-Visa Refusals
According to Department of State regulations, the principal
consular officer at each consulate, or a delegate, must review all
refusals that cannot be overcome by the presentation of addi-
tional evidence." 0 Typically, the reviewing officer checks the
However, a consular officer who once served at Monterrey, Mexdco, said he does
not tell an applicant what he needs to overcome a refusal because he believes the
applicant would submit forged documents. Interview with consular officer in San
Diego, California (July 30, 1977).
107. If the consular officer thinks that he must give a refusal pursuant to §
221(g), he issues a visa pending submission of the required document. The oath is
issued and the visa approved. The visa file is then transmitted to the cashier.
When the applicant returns with the document, he merely goes to the cashier,
hands in the document, and receives the visa. A second scheduled interview with
the consular officer is avoided.
108. Gordon, Recent Developments in Judicial Review of Immigration Cases, 15
SAN DIEGO . REV. 9, 16 (1977).
109. 22 C.F.R. § 42.130 (1977).
110. Id. § 42.130(b).
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grounds of ineligibility indicated on the refusal sheet prepared by
the immigrant visa officer and any attached supporting docu-
ments. If the reviewing officer does not concur in the refusal, he
must refer the case to the Visa Office for an advisory opinion or
take jurisdiction of the case himself."'1 Regulations further pro-
vide for Departmental review upon Departmental request. De-
partmental rulings interpreting law are binding upon consular
officers." 2 According to Departmental policy, visas are either is-
sued or refused. There are no temporary refusals."13 Review may
be deferred if the grounds may be overcome, as in the public
charge and insufficient documents categories, and if the applicant
indicates he will attempt to overcome the refusal.114 Doubtful
cases require immediate review." 5
The Department apparently adopted these review procedures
in response to criticisms of the consular officer's unreviewable au-
thority to refuse visas.116 Members of the American Bar Associa-
tion, for example, charged that prior procedures encouraged "the
arbitrary and irresponsible exercise of power" and that in doubt-
ful cases, the officer took the least risk by refusing the visa."17 To-
day the opposite is true. Consular officers believe that issuing the
visa results in the least risk.118 One officer said: "The nice thing
about our job is that if you issue the visa you can't make a mis-
take. It is only when you refuse that you've made a mistake.""19
One reason that issuing the visa is less risky for the officer is that
refusals invite outside inquiries from Congressmen and other in-
terested outsiders.120 Another reason is that issuances are rarely
reviewed at the consulates' 2 ' even though Visa Office policy re-
111. Id.
112. Id. § 42.130(c).
113. 9 Dep't of State, Foreign Affairs Manual pt. 3, § 42.130 note 1.1 (1977) there-
inafter cited as Manual].
114. Id. note 1.3(e).
115. Id.
116. 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 3.8b, at
3-57 (rev. ed. 1977).
117. Report, American Bar Association's Resolutions, 7 AD. L. BuL. 235, 236
(1954).
118. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Guadala-
jara, Mexico (Aug. 8, 1977).
119. Id.
120. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico (July 12, 1977).
121. Forty-nine percent of visa officers responding to the questionnaire an-
quires internal spot checks of issued visas.122
In general, the scope of administrative review of immigrant visa
refusals is minimal. One reviewing officer lamented that ensuring
strict adherence to the rules of eligibility bordered on the impos-
sible.123 Often the few documents accompanying the refusal
sheet explain very little.124 As a rule, the reviewing officer either
sustains the refusal or returns it with comments to the appropri-
ate officer. In the latter case, the original denying officer usually
alters his determination.125 Reviewing officers seldom refer cases
to the Visa Office for advisory opinions126 or take jurisdiction and
issue the visa.12 7 The Department seldom asks to review refused
visas.128
There are other problems in the effort to comply with the re-
view requirement. First, the reviewing officer may be inade-
quately trained in the intricacies of the law, which results in
rubber-stamped concurrences with the original officer's refusal.1
29
Second, the principal officer's refusals may go unreviewed.130
Finally, the applicant usually is uninformed about review proce-
dures. His lack of information therefore precludes him from
presenting arguments in his behalf to the reviewing officer.'31 To
swered that issuances were "never" reviewed. Another 26% answered "not very
often." See Appendix B (Statistical Responses to Questionnaire), question 15(a).
122. Interview with staff members of the Department of State Visa Office in
Washington, D.C. (June 9, 1977). One consular officer in Tijuana, Mexico, sug-
gested that the Visa Office implement stricter review of issued visas. Interview
with consular officer at the United States consulate in Tijuana, Mexico (July 5,
1977).
123. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Guadala-
jara, Mexico (Aug. 8, 1977).
124. Id. Typically, the refusing officer writes a few sentences explaining the
grounds of ineligibility on the refusal sheet and attaches any relevant documents
supporting the refusal. If an applicant is refused a visa on the ground that he is
likely to become a public charge, for example, the consular officer might attach to
the refusal sheet a copy of the applicant's job offer as evidence of inadequate in-
come.
125. Id.
126. Interviews with consular officers at the United States consulate in Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico (July 8-14, 1977).
127. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Guadala-
jara, Mexico (Aug. 8, 1977).
128. Interview with consular officers at the United States consulate in Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico (July 8-12, 1977). According to these officers, however, Departmen-
tal requests to review are less frequent in Mexico than in other countries where
refusals are less routine and involve, for example, suspected subversives.
129. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Halifax,
Canada (July 7, 1977).
130. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Toronto,
Canada (July 20, 1977).
131. None of the consular officers interviewed in Mexico and Canada explained
to the applicant that the refusal would be reviewed by another officer. But cf. Ap-
pendix B, question 14 (majority of consular officers responding to the question-
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avoid inconvenience and to assure the applicant a more equitable
determination of eligibility, at least one consulate reviews perma-
nent refusals before the alien leaves the office.132 Consular of-
ficers argue, however, that review is continuous in the sense that
aliens know that they are free to return repeatedly with new evi-
dence of eligibility to immigrate. 33 Indeed, applicants overcame
almost fifty percent of all immigrant visa refusals in 1975.134 Still,
effective review is independent review away from those who were
involved in the initial determination. 3 5
Ultimately, outside inquiries, although limited in number, may
provide more effective review of visa refusals than the standard
procedure. Frequent congressional inquiries into particular cases
raise the ire of consular officers, but they elicit immediate re-
sponses as well.136 In fact, some posts in Mexico abide by a self-
imposed three-day response rule to congressional inquiries.137
The consulate has three days from the time an inquiry is received
to review a refusal and to respond in writing. Although proce-
dures differ among consulates, the refusing officer typically re-
views the file and prepares a response. A reviewing officer, and
sometimes the principal consular officer, then edits and approves
the refusal and the response.138 Although this process results in
the alteration of few determinations, 39 review is rather thorough.
naire indicated that they do tell the applicant about the review process).
However, the interview results warrant the conclusion that the officers responding
to the questionnaire misinterpreted the question. The officers seem to have con-
strued the question as inquiring whether they advise applicants of their rights to
reapply, to present new evidence, or to seek waivers of ineligibility from the INS.
132. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Montreal,
Canada (July 14, 1977).
133. Interview With consular officer at the United States consulate in Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico (July 12, 1977).
134. VISA OFFICE REPORT, supra note 19, at 76.
135. K. DAVis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASEBOOK 523 (6th ed. 1977).
136. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Guadala-
jara, Mexico (Aug. 11, 1977). Another consular officer stated that he and his fellow
officers were continually responding to congressional allegations that consular of-
ficers abuse their authority. Interview with consular officer at the United States
consulate in Tijuana, Mexico (July 5, 1977). Yet another consular officer admitted
that constant congressional pressure wears down visa officers and adversely af-
fects the equity of the process. Interview with consular officer at the United States
consulate in Tijuana, Mexico (July 7, 1977).
137. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Guadala-
jara, Mexico (Aug. 11, 1977).
138. Id.
139. Most consular officers deny that they feel pressured by congressional in-
quiries to alter their decisions. See Appendix B, question 15(h).
Still other situations lead to informal review. Inquiries from at-
torneys are probably less commonplace and less effective than
are congressional inquiries, but the Visa Office requires consular
officers to inform the applicant's attorney of record of the grounds
for refusal.140 Widespread compliance with this notification re-
quirement seems doubtful because the Visa Office recently felt
compelled to instruct all foreign posts to adhere to the policy.
14 1
Private individuals and organizations also demand reconsidera-
tion of refusals, to little avail. 42 Reconsideration demands from
the Catholic Conference of El Paso upon the consulate in Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico, are prolific and are one of the largest problems
facing that consulate.143 Finally, the prospect of a poor perform-
ance evaluation may encourage a consular officer to conform in
advance to a superior's position,'" but most officers deny any
such influence on their decisions.
45
A consular officer may request at any time an advisory opinion
from the Visa Office interpreting law or regulations.14 6 Referral
for an advisory opinion of certain specified classes of cases is
mandatory.147 These classes of cases include those involving war
criminals, fraud, and activities prejudicial to the security of the
140. Airgram from the Department of State to all American Diplomatic and
Consular Posts (except Chiang Mai) and the District Administrators of the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands, the Governor of American Samoa, and the Execu-
tive Secretary of the Canal Zone, Message Ref. No. A-4660, at 2 n.3 (Nov. 14, 1977)
(on file with the San Diego Law Review).
141. Id. However, in Tijuana, Mexico, the Chief of the Visa Section has set
aside Wednesday of every week for meetings with attorneys and immigration
counselors. At these meetings attorneys and counselors may discuss their client's
visa rejections with the supervisor of the Immigrant Visa Section. Interview with
consular officer at the United States consulate in Tijuana, Mexico (July 5, 1977).
142. Interview with consular officer at the United States Embassy in Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico (July 8, 1977).
143. Id.
144. Interview with consular officer at the United States Embassy in Mexico
City, Mexico (Aug. 1, 1977).
145. See Appendix B, questions 15(g), (j).
140. Manual, supra note 113, § 42.90 note 1.1. According to the staff of the Visa
Office, anyone may request an advisory opinion. Interview with staff members at
the Department of State Visa Office in Washington, D.C. (June 9, 1977). The evi-
dence indicates, however, that if anyone may request an advisory opinion, it is a
well-kept secret. See Appendix B, question 15(d). Moreover, in a recent airgram
the Department indicated that it is opposed to legislation that would subject refus-
als to Visa Office review as to issues of both law and fact. In a statement some-
what contradictory to the notion that anyone may request an advisory opinion, the
Visa Office claimed that it "will consider allowing attorneys to submit requests for
review directly to [the Visa Office] in selected cases." Airgram from the Depart-
ment of State to all American Diplomatic and Consular Posts (except Chiang Mai)
and the District Administrators of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, the
Governor of American Samoa, and the Executive Secretary of the Canal Zone,
Message Ref. No. A-460, at 4 n.5 (Nov. 14, 1977) (on file with the San Diego Law
Review).
147. Manual, supra note 113, § 42.90 note 1.2.
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United States. 48 Departmental rulings regarding interpretations
of law, as opposed to the applications of law to facts, are bind-
ing.14 9 Otherwise, Departmental opinions are merely advisory.
Such advisory opinions play only a minor role in day-to-day op-
erations at the consulates. 5 0 Some consular officers believe that
the Visa Office is too far removed from factual settings to be able
to help them in their work.'5' Others believe that the Advisory
Opinion Division of the Visa Office has had little experience over-
seas and cannot comprehend the situations at remote posts.
52
One officer in Toronto, Canada, explained that he could make as
enlightened a decision as could the Visa Office and that he saw no
reason to "waste time" with advisory opinions. 53 Still another of-
ficer claimed that he had requested an advisory opinion on an in-
terpretation of law but had never received a satisfactory
answer.54 Regardless of how seldom consular officers request
advisory opinions, in general they will treat a clear answer as de-
terminative of the question in issue.
1 55
As a device to check consular officer discretion, the review pro-
cedures established in the regulatory scheme are inadequate. The
sheer volume of determinations at some posts15 6 and the meager
148. Id. See L & N. Act §§ 212(a) (9), (19), (27), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a) (9), (19), (27)
(1976).
149. 22 C.F.R. § 42.130(c) (1977).
150. See Appendix B, questions 15(d), (e).
151. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Toronto,
Canada (July 25, 1977).
152. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Halifax,
Canada (July 7, 1977).
153. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Toronto,
Canada (July 25, 1977). This officer vil not request an advisory opinion unless it
is obligatory that he do so.
154. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico (July 8, 1977). The officer's request involved the treatment of so-
cial security old age benefits under the public charge provision. Specifically, his
question was whether immigrants whose ages would immediately qualify them for
old age benefits should be considered likely to become public charges and thus re-
fused visas. The officer still does not know the proper treatment of old age bene-
fits under the public charge provision. Id.
155. See Appendix B, question 15(f).
156. The number of immigrant visa refusals that officers must review at the
Monterrey and Ciudad Juarez consulates in Mexico is staggering. From July, 1976,
through June, 1977, the Monterrey consulate refused 14,210 immigrant visas, more
than any other post in Mexico. Thus, the Chief of the Visa Section was charged
with the responsibility of reviewing an average of 1,184 refusals per month, or
roughly 60 refusals each working day. The busiest month accounted for 1,865 re-
fusals, and the calmest, 610 refusals. During the same period of time, the Ciudad
procedural requirements for documenting refusals 5 7 limit the
depth and the effectiveness of review. Typically, the reviewing of-
ficer sees only a brief paragraph of the consular officer's findings
and one document supporting the refusal. 58 Some reviewing of-
ficers are poorly trained as visa officers. 59 Some reviewing of-
ficers' refusals are never reviewed.160 Other refusals are not
considered permanent and therefore are not reviewed.161 Review
of issued visas is cursory, if done at all.162 Review is secret,163 and
reviewing officers all but ignore the alternatives of advisory opin-
ions or of taking jurisdiction and issuing visas themselves.164 On
its part, the Visa Office seldom initiates the advisory opinion pro-
cedure. 65 After considering these findings, it does not seem sur-
prising that most officers deny that the prospect of review affects
their determinations. 166
Consular officers consider informal avenues of review a waste
of time and a nuisance. 67 Inquiries from Congressmen, attor-
neys, and other interested outsiders might encourage a second
look, but according to most consular officers they seldom result in
a reversed determination.168 Even the threat of poor performance
reports carries little weight. 6 9
The inadequacies of Departmental provisions for administrative
review at the post and for advisory opinions from the Visa Office,
Juarez consulate refused 3,859 applicants, less than any other consulate in Mex-
ico. Ciudad Juarez averaged 321 refusals per month, with 618 in the busiest month
and 232 in the calmest month. Visa Office statistics for individual consulates in
Mexico and in Canada, July, 1976-June, 1977 (on file with the San Diego Law
Review). Reviewing officers have many duties aside from review of refusals. As a
result, reviewing officers at high-volume posts such as those in Mexico have only a
brief time to consider each refusal.
157. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Guadala-
jara, Mexico (Aug. 8, 1977).
158. Id.
159. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Halifax,
Canada (July 7, 1977).
160. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Toronto,
Canada (July 20, 1977).
161. Interview with staff member at the United States consulate in Winnipeg,
Canada (Aug. 4, 1977).
162. See Appendix B, question 15(a).
163. See note 131 and accompanying text supra.
164. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Guadala-
jara, Mexico (Aug. 8, 1977).
165. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico (July 8, 1977).
166. Seventy-two percent of responding visa officers denied that review would
affect their determinations. See Appendix B, question 15(c).
167. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Guadala-
jara, Mexico (Aug. 11, 1977).
168. See Appendix B, question 15(h).
169. Id. questions 15(j), (j) (1).
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coupled with judicial nonreviewability of consular determina-
tions,170 leave consular officers with considerable discretion to is-
sue or refuse immigrant visas. Determinations may escape
review altogether as temporary refusals, as refusals by the re-
viewing officer in the first instance, or as issued visas. Even when
determinations are reviewed, the scope of review is narrow be-
cause of the vast number of appeals at some posts and the mini-
mal documentation of findings and reasons required. Finally,
there is no systematic use of the advisory opinion procedure to
spot-check determinations. As a result, Departmental review pro-
cedures largely are an inefficacious check on the consular officer's
discretion.
Consular Discretionary Authority Under Specific
Grounds of Ineligibility
Structuring discretion organizes or orders consular discretion-
ary authority to refuse immigrant visas.17 1 It establishes and
weights factors that merit consideration in visa determinations.172
Section 221(g) partially confines the acceptable grounds for visa
refusal to thirty-two specific categories of ineligibility. 7 3 Guide-
lines for each category attempt to structure consular authority.
By focusing on the more important categories of ineligibil-
ity-public charge and fraud-this section of the Study examines
the effectiveness of attempts to structure discretionary authority.
Discretion Under the Section 212(a) (15) Public Charge
Ground of Ineligibility
The public charge provision of the Act is responsible for the
greatest number of immigrant visa refusals. 74 In 1975, after tak-
ing into account refusals overcome, consular officers relied on the
public charge provision to deny visas in almost sixty percent of all
refusals. 7 5 During the period from July, 1976, through June, 1977,
the public charge provision accounted for sixty-one percent of all
initial refusals in Mexico but only eleven percent of all initial
170. Gordon, Recent Developments in Judicial Review of Immigration Cases, 15
SAN DIEGo L. REV. 9, 16 (1977).
171. K. DAVIS, ADuisNTRATVE LAW TExT 94 (3d ed. 1972).
172. Id.
173. L & N. Act § 221(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g) (1976).
174. VISA OFnCE REPORT, supra note 19, at 76.
175. Id.
refusals in Canada. 76
On its face, the public charge provision of the Act represents a
broad grant of discretion. Ineligibility includes "[a]liens who, in
the opinion of the consular officer at the time of application for a
visa,... are likely at any time to become public charges."'77
Departmental regulations attempt to structure this discretion. A
sworn job offer from an employer in the United States, for exam-
ple, may establish eligibility. 78 However, these regulations pro-
vide that consular officers must presume ineligible aliens who
rely solely on expected income that falls below the income pov-
erty guidelines. 79
The interpretative and procedural notes to the Departmental
regulations attempt more detailed structuring of the public charge
provision.18O These notes contain Departmental policy governing
acceptable types of public charge evidence.181 A partial list of
such evidence includes bank deposits, pre-arranged employment,
affidavits of support, and bonds posted. 82
Departmental policy places a high priority on flexibility in the
evaluation of evidence regarding sufficient funds to meet the pub-
lic charge provision. 83 According to the Foreign Affairs Manual,
consular officers should consider a variety of factors, including
the applicant's age, his physical condition, his family status, and
economic conditions in the United States. 84 Moreover, stated
policy prohibits consular officers from using "a fixed sum of
money as a sole criterion for judging a prospective immigrant's
ability to meet the public charge requirement of the law."'85
Yet Departmental policy provides for the presumption of ineli-
gibility when an applicant relies solely on expected income that is
below the income poverty guidelines.186 The income poverty
guidelines are published by the Community Service Administra-
tion and adopted by the Department for use in determining eligi-
bility under the public charge provision.187 The presumption of
176. This disparity is caused by the economic differences between applicants in
Mexico and in Canada. Visa Office statistics for individual consulates in Mexico
and in Canada, July, 1976-June, 1977 (on file with the San Diego Law Review).
177. L & N. Act § 212(a) (15), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (15) (1976) (emphasis added).
178. 22 C.F.R § 42.91(a) (15) (ii) (1977).
179. Id. § 42.91(a) (15) (iii).
180. See Manual, supra note 113, § 42.91(a) (15) notes 1-9 & Exhibit I (income
poverty guideline tables).
181. Id.
182. Id. notes 2-5.
183. Id. note 1.1.
184. Id.
185. Id. note 1.3.
186. 22 C.F. § 42.91 (a) (15) (iii) (1977).
187. Airgram from the Department of State to all American Diplomatic and
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ineligibility seems to contradict the prohibition against a "Tixed
sum" analysis and the flexibility requirement. However, the pre-
sumption is not without exception. Ordinarily, a determination of
the sufficiency of an applicant's expected income must include
consideration of all dependent family members accompanying the
applicant to, or already residing in, the United States.188 An ex-
ception applies if dependent family members already residing in
the United States receive public assistance and the presence of
the applicant would probably diminish the level of public assist-
ance.189 Thus, an applicant whose expected income falls below
the poverty guidelines for a family his size may still be issued a
visa if dependent family members are already in the United
States and are receiving public assistance.
Consular officers admit that the public charge provision confers
a large amount of discretion upon immigrant visa-issuing of-
icers.190 One officer said: "It is a judgment decision. The law is
written that way."191 Even consular officers who steadfastly deny
exercising discretion invariably admit issuing visas to applicants
of questionable eligibility when impressed by the applicant's de-
sire, language skills, or character.192 This result is laudable, for it
ensures flexibility and "individualized justice."
93
However, the immigration bar in the United States charges im-
migrant visa officers with widespread abuse of discretion and in-
flexibility under the public charge provision. An attorney in New
York City states that with respect to the public charge provision,
"the discretion, attitude, perspective, call it what you will, of the
consul[ar officer] is the determining factor."194 One attorney in
Houston, Texas, alleged that consular officers rarely exercise dis-
Consular Posts (except Chiang Mai) and the District Administrators of the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands, the Governor of American Samoa, and the Execu-
tive Secretary of the Canal Zone, Message Ref. No. A-2152 (5/17/77), income pov-
erty guideline tables (rev. May 25, 1977) (on fie with the San Diego Law Review).
188. Manual, supra note 113, § 42.91(a) (15) note 3.5.
189. Id.
190. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Monter-
rey, Mexico (July 18, 1977).
191. Interview with consular officer at the United States Embassy in Mexico
City, Mexico (Aug. 1, 1977).
192. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Monter-
rey, Mexico (July 19, 1977); Interview with consular officer at the United States
consulate in Tijuana, Mexico (July 6, 1977).
193. K. DAvIs, ADuMSTRATrVE LAW T*ExT 91-93 (3d ed. 1972).
194. Letter from William B. Taffet to Kim R. Anderson (Oct. 31, 1977) (on ifie
with the San Diego Law Review).
cretion in favor of applicants.195 He states that "all doubt in my
experience is resolved in favor of the Government, i.e., adverse to
the alien.' 96 Still another immigration attorney claims that "all
discretionary authority of the Consul[ar officer] is an abuse and
has no merits at all."
97
A major area of consular officer discretion lies in the application
of the income poverty guidelines. As one attorney explains,
"[t]he Consul[ar officer] exercises his discretion to decide
whether $200 or $500 less than the Guideline might be sufficient or
whether because of what he deems to be particular factors and
circumstances, $2,000 or $3,000 above the Guideline is still not
sufficient."'9 8 Some consular officers are quite inflexible and rig-
idly apply the income poverty guidelines.199 An inflexible officer
will refuse a visa whenever an applicant's expected income falls
below the guidelines.
200
It is not difficult to understand why a consular officer might be
inflexible. Officers at high-volume visa-issuing posts face severe
time constraints. 20 1 One officer said: 'The demand has just
mushroomed in Mexico. When it really gets busy we can't work
here. The [local staff] get into fights, everyone is exhausted."
202
To save time, many consular officers paste the guidelines in in-
conspicuous but convenient locations for constant reference.
203
Inadequate investigative resources exacerbate the tendency of
some officers to rely almost exclusively on the income poverty
guidelines.20 4 Finally, many officers fear that state welfare rolls
195. Letter from Sam Williamson to Kim R. Anderson (Oct. 27, 1977) (on file
with the San Diego Law Review).
196. Id.
197. Letter from H. John Herod, Director of the Visitor & Immigrant Service
Agency of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, to Kim R. Anderson (Nov. 3, 1977) (on file with
the San Diego Law Review).
198. Letter from William B. Taffet to Kim R. Anderson (Oct. 31, 1977) (on file
with the San Diego Law Review).
199. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico (July 12, 1977).
200. Id.
201. The authors observed that immigrant visa-issuing officers at such posts av-
erage 25-35 applicant interviews per day with an average time per interview of 5-15
minutes.
202. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Guadala-
jara, Mexico (Aug. 9, 1977).
203. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Monter-
rey, Mexico (July 19, 1977).
204. In Ciudad Juarez, for example, the investigative unit consists of one local
employee who works part-time, primarily checking newspapers. Interview with
consular officer at the United States consulate in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico (July 8,
1977). In Mexico City the investigative unit was still largely in the planning stages
when one of the authors visited. Interview with Fernando Sanchez, Chief of the
Fraud Unit, at the United States Embassy in Mexico City, Mexico (Aug. 3, 1977).
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are swelling with resident aliens.2 05 Indeed, one officer asked,
"What am I doing to my country?" 206 Of course, it is arguable that
such statements reflect bias on the part of consular officers.
However compelling the reasons for inflexibility of consular of-
ficers, the resulting determinations seem particularly harsh. One
applicant, for example, had been robbed and injured and unable
to work for three months in 1976.207 His income for the year thus
was below poverty level. When he returned from the United
States to the consulate in Honduras, he was earning $125 per
week and his wife $112 per week. They had deposited $1,500 in
the bank. Both visas were refused under the public charge provi-
sion. Husband and wife were forced to remain in Honduras to the
detriment of their sick child. In another case, two aliens applying
for visas at Guadalajara, Mexico, were refused under the public
charge provision, although they later overcame the refusals. 208
The delay caused both aliens to lose their jobs in the United
States.
The Department is not unaware of the problem. Recently, for
example, the Association of Immigration and Nationality Lawyers
reported to the Visa Office that certain consulates misuse the in-
come poverty guidelines. 209 To its credit, the Visa Office dissemi-
nated a clarification to all consular posts, reiterating that a
consular officer may not "base his decision on an unsupported
personal assessment of whether or not a person can live on the
205. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico (July 12, 1977). An officer in Tijuana, Mexico, suggested that public
charge provision guidelines should relate to corresponding welfare programs in
the United States. Even though an applicant meets the poverty guidelines, the ap-
plicant, once he enters the United States, may still be at an income level that en-
ables him to receive AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) and SSI
(Supplemental Security Income). Interview with consular officer at the United
States consulate in Tijuana, Mexico (July 5, 1977).
206. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico (July 12, 1977).
207. Letter from Philip J. Kleiner of the New York law firm of Barst & Mukamal
to Kim R. Anderson (Nov. 3, 1977) (on file with the San Diego Law Review).
208. Letter from H. John Herod, Director of the Visitor & Immigrant Service
Agency of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, to Kim R. Anderson (Nov. 3, 1977) (on file with
the San Diego Law Review).
209. Airgram from the Department of State to all American Diplomatic and
Consular Posts (except Chiang Mai) and the District Administrators of the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands, the Governor of American Samoa, and the Execu-
tive Secretary of the Canal Zone, Message Ref. No. A-4660, at 4 n.11 (Nov. 14, 1977)
(on fie with the San Diego Law Review).
income listed."210
Of course, some consular officers consider factors other than
the income poverty guidelines. In most determinations, the dis-
tinction between approaches probably resembles a continuum,
with a greater or lesser degree of consideration given to a greater
or fewer variety of factors, depending on the particular officer.
Some of the more significant factors are examined below.
A valid job offer is the most important element in meeting the
public charge provision. Validity is tested by a myriad of factors.
One factor is whether the applicant's expected wages are com-
mensurate with the type of job he expects to have. Some consu-
lar officers are suspicious any time expected wages are above the
minimum wage.211 The stated reason at the Ciudad Juarez, Mex-
ico, consulate for this suspicion is that in Texas employers usu-
ally pay aliens at a rate below the minimum wage. 12 Another
factor is whether the applicant appears qualified for a particular
job. Officers commonly compare an applicant's work experience
and degree of literacy with the type of work an employer has of-
fered him.213 Other indicators of validity include whether a pro-
spective job is seasonal or permanent and the location of the
employer.214 Thus, a year-round industrial job might qualify the
applicant while a temporary agricultural job often will not.
The slightest irregularity in the circumstances surrounding the
job offer alerts consular officers to the possibility of fraud. Often
technical irregularities in a job letter, such as the absence of a let-
terhead or poor grammar, cause the officer to reject the job letter
as fraudulent. 5 The sale of fraudulent documents, including job
offers, is big business. 216 In one case, job offers written on station-
ery stolen from an El Paso, Texas, hotel surfaced at the consulate
in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico. 217 Only after consular officers realized
that conspicuous numbers of offers were written on hotel station-
ery did they uncover the fraud. Because of the prevalence of
210. Id.
211. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico (July 12, 1977).
212. Id.
213. Interviews with consular officers at the United States consulate in Guada-
lajara, Mexico (Aug. 8-12, 1977); Interviews with consular officers at the United
States consulate in Tijuana, Mexico (July 5-6, 1977). See Appendix B, questions 4,
8.
214. See authorities cited note 213 supra.
215. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Tijuana,
Mexico (July 12, 1977).
216. Interview with INS Inspector Garza at the United States Santa Fe Bridge
Border Patrol Office in El Paso, Texas (July 13, 1977).
217. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico (July 12, 1977).
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fraudulent job offers, some officers do not take job offers at face
value.2 18 Instead, officers demand to see W-2 forms, payroll re-
ceipts, income tax statements, and even an employer's statement
of wages paid to employees.2 19 As a last resort, officers at the post
in Ciudad Juarez sometimes telephone employers to verify job of-
fers.22
0
The Visa Office is concerned about the propriety of some of
these requests for additional documents. The Association of Im-
migration and Nationality Lawyers has complained that one con-
sulate required the prospective employer to justify hiring the
applicant by demonstrating the employer's inability to fill the po-
sition locally.221 The Visa Office rejected this line of inquiry in an
airgram to all posts. 22 2 In response to another Association com-
plaint, the Visa Office instructed its posts to require only an appli-
cant's last income tax return and to refrain from requesting proof
of payment of all taxes.22
Although it is questionable whether consular officers comply
with these instructions, aliens are well-advised to gather all the
income records they can. Requests for proof of income can be ex-
tensive. A New York attorney reports the following example: An
alien earned $150 per week from November, 1976, to March, 1977,
and thereafter $184 per week plus overtime.22 4 The applicant's
spouse earned $125 per week. The immigrant visa officer rejected
a paycheck stub as proof of income. The officer requested an em-
ployer's statement of wages paid to employees, independent proof
218. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Guadala-
jara, Mexico (Aug. 12, 1977); Interview with consular officer at the United States
consulate in Monterrey, Mexico (July 19, 1977). Both consular officers treat job of-
fers like affidavits of support, which are nonbinding, and require other evidence of
actual income.
219. The authors witnessed numerous requests for such evidence of income
during interviews between consular officers and visa applicants.
220. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico (July 12, 1977).
221. Airgram from the Department of State to all American Diplomatic and
Consular Posts (except Chiang Mai) and the District Administrators of the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands, the Governor of American Samoa, and the Execu-
tive Secretary of the Canal Zone, Message Ref. No. A-616, at 4 n.9 (Jan. 31, 1977)
(on fie with the San Diego Law Review).
222. Id.
223. Id. n.10.
224. Letter from Philip J. Kleiner of the New York law firm of Barst & Mukamal
to Kim R. Anderson (Nov. 3,1977) (on file with the San Diego Law Review).
of a change in the applicant's wages, a letter from the welfare of-
fice, and a letter from the hospital regarding childbirth expenses.
Family size is another important criterion under the public
charge provision. Consular officers are careful to ascertain the
number of dependent family members accompanying the appli-
cant or already residing in the United States. Again, a high inci-
dence of fraud frequently thwarts these efforts.225 Discrepancies
between the number of dependents claimed for tax purposes and
for visa application purposes are common.2
26
Another problem involves the definition of dependents for pur-
poses of determining family size. One applicant with an annual
income of $6,250 was refused a visa at Winnipeg, Canada, because
the consular officer held the alien responsible for the support of
his wife's children by a former marriage.227 The applicant's attor-
ney protested that his client had no legal duty to support the chil-
dren.228 Departmental guidelines are silent on the issue. The
decision to refuse under these circumstances falls within the dis-
cretion of the consular officer. The applicant has no legal re-
course. However, in a similar case at Guadalajara, Mexico, the
officer did not hold the applicant responsible for the support of
the wife's premarital illegitimate child.229 The officer issued the
visa.
Informal policy at one consulate requires a head-of-household
applicant to make sufficient income to support his entire family,
even if he is the only one immigrating.230 The presumption is that
the applicant must support his family whether it remains in the
foreign country or accompanies him to the United States. This
policy apparently was developed to respond to immigration law-
yers who advised clients to split their families and apply one at a
time to make it easier to meet the poverty-level income require-
ment.23' The asserted justification for the policy is that it is the
intent of the Act to unite families, not to separate them.232
225. Consular officers charge that proving the number of dependent family
members is difficult because applicants often inflate the number for income tax
purposes while working in the United States. Interview with consular officer at
the United States consulate in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico (July 12, 1977).
226. Id.
227. Letter from H. John Herod, Director of the Visitor & Immigrant Service
Agency of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, to Kim R. Anderson (Nov. 3,1977) (on file with
the San Diego Law Review).
228. Id.
229. Interview between visa applicant and consular officer at the United States
consulate in Guadalajara, Mexico (Aug. 9, 1977).
230. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Monter-
rey, Mexico (July 19, 1977).
231. Id.
232. Id.
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Policies at other consulates are less strict. For instance, the
policy of the principal consular officer at Toronto, Canada, is to re-
quire the prospective immigrant to demonstrate only the ability
to support himself.233
Consular officers do comply with the diminution-of-public-
assistance exception.23 4 If the applicant's family already receives
welfare in the United States and his earning capacity might re-
duce the amount of assistance it needs, consular officers will issue
the visa.2 = For example, an applicant's wife at Guadalajara, Mex-
ico, presented a letter from her welfare office in Texas indicating
that she was withdrawing from public assistance because of her
alien husband's income. 3 The officer issued the visa even though
the applicant's income fell below the income poverty guide-
lines. 23
7
A related problem involves the definition of "public charge."
Departmental guidelines in the Foreign Affairs Manual do not de-
fine the term. The consul general at Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, be-
lieves that the term causes some confusion, as in the case of
elderly applicants who qualify for social security old age bene-
fits.238 Members of the immigration bar agree. One attorney re-
ports, for example, that an applicant was refused a visa because
his wife received social security benefits as a widow of a prior
marriage.23 9 The officer held that the receipt of any government
funds constitutes a public charge.240 The officer eventually re-
versed his decision and issued the visa after the attorney per-
233. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Toronto,
Canada (July 20, 1977). This also appears to be the policy in Tijuana, Mexico.
Usually the case arises when a family wants a visa for each member. The consular
officer will ascertain the income of the income producers within that family. A
visa will then be granted only to those members whom the officer believes the
family income producer can support.
234. Interviews with consular officers at the United States consulate in Guada-
lajara, Mexico (Aug. 8-12, 1977).
235. Id.
236. Interview between visa applicant and consular officer at the United States
consulate in Guadalajara, Mexico (Aug. 9, 1977). Explained the officer:. "Some-
times you grant the visa even if the income is under the guidelines. Otherwise
everyone will be on welfare. This way it saves us all a little money." Id.
237. Id.
238. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico (July 8, 1977). See also note 154 and accompanying text supra.
239. Letter from H. John Herod, Director of the Visitor & Immigrant Service
Agency of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, to Kim R. Anderson (Nov. 3, 1977) (on file with
the San Diego Law Review).
240. Id.
suaded him that social security is not welfare. 241
Consular officers usually ignore affidavits of support from spon-
sors in the United States because such affidavits are unenforce-
able.242 In close cases, however, affidavits can bolster an
applicant's case for eligibility.243 Officers look to the closeness of
the relationship between applicant and sponsor and consider
whether the applicant is dependent on the sponsor.244 In one in-
stance the consul general at Montreal, Canada, considered it an
abuse of discretion to deny an application under the public
charge provision when a prominent citizen gave the affidavit.45
Cases of borderline eligibility turn on more subjective factors.
Interviews between the applicant and the consular officer are
often determinative. An officer's overall impression of an ap-
plicant can be the deciding factor.246 Education and English-lan-
guage skills, for example, are usually unimportant unless an
applicant's prospective employment requires a specific level of
skill. In close cases in Mexico, however, some officers are im-
pressed by an applicant who has completed high school.247 The
hardship a refusal will cause may be considered as well. 248 In fact,
individual officers often decide close cases for idiosyncratic rea-
241. Id.
242. Interviews with consular officers at the United States consulate in Guada-
lajara, Mexico (Aug. 8-12, 1977).
243. Id.
244. On the issue of dependency, one officer said that an affidavit of support
from a husband for his wife would be significant. However, an affidavit of support
from a wife for her husband would not be significant because traditionally the wife
is not under a duty to support her husband. Interview with consular officer at the
United States consulate in Guadalajara, Mexico (Aug. 8,1977).
245. Even though the affidavit was not legally enforceable, for the applicant to
fail to support his sister would have been a public embarassment this gentleman
would not likely have risked. The consul general at Montreal felt that the affidavit
should have been sufficient to allow the applicant to overcome the provisions of I.
& N. Act § 212(a) (15), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) (15) (1976). Interview with consular officer
at the United States consulate in Montreal, Canada (July 15, 1977).
246. For example, a consular officer in Montreal, Canada, believed that the of-
ficer's personal impressions of the applicant will be an important factor in the visa
determination approximately five percent of the time. In these borderline cases,
such an impression could be the determining factor in the issuance of the visa. In-
terview with consular officers at the United States consulate in Montreal, Canada
(July 15, 1977).
247. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Guadala-
jara, Mexico (Aug. 9, 1977).
248. In one case a visa was issued to a Canadian spouse of an American citizen
when the sole evidence of support to rebut a public charge provision refusal was a
bank account of approximately $1,200. The extenuating circumstances were that
the two had sold their home in Canada and were driving through Halifax to pick
up their visa as the first leg of their journey. The consular officer stated that in
circumstances like these the visa would be more likely to issue than if no hardship
would occur if it were refused. Interview with consular officer at a United States
consulate in Canada (1977).
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sons. One officer is biased against unwed mothers249 and favors
certain ethnic groups.250 Another officer requires applicants to
transfer their bank accounts to the United States before he will
issue the visa.251 Still another officer likes to see an applicant's
children to gauge the quality of care they receive.252 Finally, the
officer might be indifferent. One consular officer issued a visa to
an applicant who could not prove any income for the prior year.
2 53
The officer explained that she just did not "want to hassle with it
today."2
54
An altogether different type of case is the "stateside" case at
the consulates in Canada.255 These cases involve aliens who have
been living illegally in the United States and who now may be en-
titled to immigrant status.256 Such aliens originally enter the
United States by violating their status as a non-immigrant or by
not complying with the visa process. These aliens may become
entitled to immigrate to the United States if they establish certain
familial ties within the United States. To avoid the inconvenience
of a trip home to obtain an immigrant visa, which in many cases
may mean traveling thousands of miles, these aliens have been
249. Id.
250. A number of consular officers think that certain ethnic groups are more
likely to go on welfare than others. One officer believes that Canadians, Haitians,
and Portuguese are not as likely to go on welfare as Latin Americans. Id. Another
officer stated that Chinese will not go on welfare. He believes that they will live
with their families or starve before they will become wards of the state. Thus, he
views Chinese with less suspicion than other groups under the public charge pro-
vision. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Montreal,
Canada (July 23, 1977).
251. Interview with local employees at the United States consulate in Vancou-
ver, Canada (Aug. 8, 1977).
252. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Guadala-
jara, Mexico (Aug. 8, 1977). Similarly, one officer views a neat and well-dressed ap-
plicant as a more refined, strong-charactered individual who has probably worked
hard and would be less likely to go on welfare than a slovenly dressed applicant.
Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Tijuana, Mexico
(July 6, 1977).
253. Interview with consular officer at a United States consulate in Mexico
(1977).
254. Id.
255. Interview with consular officers at the United States consulate in Montreal,
Canada (July 24, 1977); Interview with consular officer at the United States consu-
late in Toronto, Canada (July 25, 1977).
256. See Airgram from the Department of State to all American Diplomatic and
Consular Posts (except Chiang Mai) and the District Administrator of the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands, the Governor of American Samoa, and the Execu-
tive Secretary of the Canal Zone, Message Ref. No. A-1691 (4/14/77) (on file with
the San Diego Law Review).
granted the privilege of going to Canada to obtain their immigrant
visas. They are allowed into Canada to obtain their visas on con-
dition that they will be allowed to return to the United States if
the visa is refused. Because a refusal of the visa simply means
the alien is to return to the United States until he can obtain bet-
ter financial evidence, most officers believe that denying such an
applicant a visa serves no purpose.257 As a result, less financial
evidence may suffice to grant a visa to one of these "stateside"
cases.258
As the foregoing discussion indicates, Departmental efforts to
structure consular officer discretion under the public charge pro-
vision have been minimal and sometimes confusing. The terms
"public charge" and "dependent family members," for example,
are inadequately defined. The presumption of ineligibility seems
to contradict the policies favoring flexibility and prohibiting a
fixed sum analysis. Perhaps these are reasons why many consu-
lar officers almost never refer to the Foreign Affairs Manual
guidelines on the public charge provision.259
The guidelines and policy statements existing under the public
charge provision have met with mixed success. Some consular of-
ficers are flexible in accordance with stated policy. Others are in-
flexible and rely too heavily on the income poverty guidelines.
However, most officers adhere to the diminution-of-public-assist-
ance exception for applicants with family members already re-
ceiving welfare in the United States.
The conclusion is that consular officers exercise a large amount
of discretion to issue or refuse immigrant visas under the public
charge provision. Major Departmental policies are contradictory,
so an officer is free to rest a decision on the policy of flexibility or
on the presumption of ineligibility. Either policy is acceptable.
Key terms are ill-defined, so a consular officer may decide for
himself what constitutes public assistance, who are dependent
family members, and whether a head-of-household applicant may
immigrate without his family. Indeed, two consulates have oppo-
site policies on the latter issue. Income documentation require-
ments are inexact, so an officer may request an extensive array of
financial evidence, yet disbelieve it. Finally, an officer may intro-
duce into the visa determination extra-legal factors such as his
opinion of certain ethnic groups, the swelling alien population in
257. Interviews with consular officers at United States consulates throughout
Canada (July-Aug., 1977).
258. Id.
259. Interviews with consular officers at the United States consulates in Ciudad
Juarez and in Monterrey, Mexico (July 8-22, 1977).
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the United States, or a mother's marital status. These extra-legal
factors indicate the pressing need for more effective structuring
and more vigorous checking of consular discretionary authority
under the public charge provision.
Fraud
An alien who procures or seeks to procure a visa or other entry
document by fraud or misrepresentation is ineligible for a visa
under the Act.2 6 0 Departmental regulations distinguish these
aliens from those seeking to enter the United States by fraud.261
The latter aliens are not ineligible to receive visas.
The Department has earnestly tried to structure the fraud pro-
vision of the Act to control unwarranted discretion in its use.
However, regulations promulgated under the fraud provision are
so complex that they have rendered fraud a seldom-used ground
of ineligibility for a visa.262 Departmental explanations of "mate-
rial facts," "willfullness," and the "rule of probability" baffle con-
sular officers.263 Time constraints prevent effective investigation
and proper documentation of aliens. As a result, visa refusals on
the ground of fraud usually require an admission of fraud by the
applicant.26
Consular officers' attitudes toward fraud vary with each post
and with individual officers. One officer believes that the com-
plexity of the statutory visa-issuing process invites some fraud
260. L & N. Act § 212(a) (19), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(19) (1976).
261. 22 C.F.R § 42.91(a) (19) (iii) (1977). Department of State regulations distin-
guish between attempts to enter the United States by fraud and attempts to pro-
cure entry documents by fraud. The latter are grounds for ineligibility; the former
are not.
A former immigration judge in the Justice Department and current Chairman on
Visa Practice of AINL explains the distinction as one between oral or written
fraud and misrepresentation. Oral fraud renders the applicant ineligible only at
the time he utters the misrepresentation. In comparison, written fraud renders
the applicant forever ineligible. Letter from William B. Taffet to Paula L. Leh-
mann (Aug. 15, 1978) (on file with the San Diego Law Review).
262. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico (July 8, 1977). See also VISA OFFIcE REPORT, supra note 19, at 76.
263. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Guadala-
jara, Mexico (Aug. 12, 1977); Interview with consular officer at the United States
consulate in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico (July 12, 1977).
264. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Monter-
rey, Mexico (July 21, 1977). If an admission is not forthcoming from the applicant,
officers will often discount the validity of the particular document in question and
refuse the visa under § 221(g) for insufficient documentation. See L & N. Act §
221(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g) (1976); notes 81-109 and accompanying text supra.
and that the consular officer should accept it and label it immate-
rial.265 Another view is that in most cases, the officer can use the
fraud provision to refuse a visa at his whim.266 Immigration attor-
neys allege that consular officers seeking admissions of fraud use
persistent interrogation to confuse and to intimidate applicants
into admitting material fraud.267 Officers respond that some attor-
neys encourage their clients' deceit.268
Consular officers in Mexico suspect that at least some fraud and
deception exist in virtually every case.269 Some officers claim
they have never seen a Mexican document reveal anything unfa-
vorable about a Mexican national.2 70 Moreover, many consular of-
ficers in Mexico believe that corruption is rampant and culturally
acceptable in Mexico.271 Consular officers at Ciudad Juarez, Mex-
ico, for example, believe that applicants can fraudulently obtain
any document requested.2 72
Only an applicant's imagination limits the variety of deceptions.
A major problem facing the Monterrey, Mexico, consulate in-
volves the use of delayed birth registrations to establish a peti-
tioner's United States citizenship.2 73 In a letter to a Texas
265. An example of such immaterial fraud would be the fraudulent obtaining of
a document in a Latin American country. It may be that it is virtually impossible
for the alien to obtain the document legitimately, but rather than appear at the
consulate without it, he may purchase a fraudulent document. Interview with con-
sular officer at the United States consulate in Montreal, Canada (July 14, 1977).
266. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Montreal,
Canada (July 15, 1977). However, this officer claims that she will not deny a visa
unless she has proof beyond a reasonable doubt that fraud was present. For ex-
ample, she described a case in which a man obtained a non-immigrant visa with
the intent of going to a hospital in New York for weight-reduction supervision.
When he arrived in New York, he instead got a job, married an American citizen,
and applied for an immigrant visa. It could be determined that he never had the
intent of entering that hospital and thus obtained the non-immigrant visa fraudu-
lently. However, the officer believed it just as likely that he had decided, upon his
arrival in New York, that he would rather remain an American resident. As she
was not convinced fraud was involved, she issued the visa. Id.
267. Letter from Philip J. Kleiner of the New York law firm of Barst & Mukamal
to Kim R. Anderson (Nov. 3, 1977) (on file with the San Diego Law Review).
268. Interview with consular officer at the United States Embassy in Mexico
City, Mexico (Aug. 1, 1977).
269. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico (July 12, 1977). See note 368 infra.
270. Interviews with consular officers at the United States consulate in Guada-
lajara, Mexico (Aug. 10 & 12, 1977).
271. Interviews with consular officers at the United States consulate in Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico (July 8-12, 1977).
272. Id.
273. One author witnessed a case in which a mother petitioned for immediate
relative status for her daughter. The daughter wished to bring seven children and
her husband with her to the United States. The mother based her claim to United
States citizenship on a birth certificate issued 43 years after she was born. The
birth certificate had been issued by Texas in 1956 on the basis of sworn affidavits
by two persons presumably knowledgeable of the circumstances surrounding the
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attorney, the Acting Director of the Visa Office explained that
"[i]n Texas, blank local birth certificates are available to practi-
cally anyone in uncontrolled numbers, and in Indiana, a quantity
of blank birth certificates, the impression seal and the signature
stamp of the health commissioner were stolen in 1972 from the
Office of Vital Records in Gary."274 As a result of this theft, the
Visa Office instructed the Monterrey post not to accept such birth
certificates. 275 Another source of fraud, common until recent in-
vestigations exposed it, involved midwives who fraudulently certi-
fied thousands of births.276 Finally, the Chief of the Monterrey
Fraud Unit expects a glut of fifth preference fraud cases.277 The
fifth preference allows a United States citizen to petition for a
preference status on behalf of a brother or a sister provided the
citizen is at least twenty-one years of age.278 Apparently, in Mex-
ico one can easily purchase a birth certificate identifying anyone
as his brother or sister.279
Some attempts to structure discretion under the fraud provi-
sion occur within each post. For example, the Immigrant Visa
Officer Handbook, compiled at the Monterrey, Mexico, post, con-
tains most of the tools for structuring discretion that Professor
Davis has suggested.280 The Handbook includes examples of
types of fraud, lists of frequent offenders, instructions on de-
tecting and documenting certain frauds, and a reading file of pol-
mother's birth. There were no documents predating the birth certificate to confirm
the mother's place of birth. The consular officer became suspicious because the
mother's place of birth was blank on both the daughter's baptismal and marriage
certificates. The father's place of birth, however, appeared on both certificates. In
response to the consular officer's inquiry, the daughter answered that her mother
could not remember where she was born. Closer inspection indicated that the offi-
cial seal upon the daughter's marriage certificate was irregular and outside the
sealing official's jurisdiction. The officer refused a visa for insufficient documenta-
tion. Interview between visa applicant and consular officer at the United States
consulate in Monterrey, Mexico (July 21, 1977).
274. Letter from William D. Morgan, Acting Director of the Visa Office, to Sam
Williamson (Sept. 20, 1977) (on file with the San Diego Law Review).
275. Id.
276. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Monter-
rey, Mexico (July 20, 1977).
277. Id.
278. I. & N. Act § 203(a) (5), 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (a) (5) (1976).
279. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Monter-
rey, Mexico (July 20, 1977).
280. See note 7 and accompanying text =upra.
icy statements.28 ' Although the authors found that consular
officers seldom refer to the Handbook, the officers seem familiar
with its contents. The Handbook is classified secret, however, ex-
cept to the extent that the Department originally published its
subject matter as policy statements or guidelines. Additionally,
the Monterrey post maintains a small precedent file of past fraud
violators.282 The Vancouver, Canada, consulate provides another
example of attempts to structure discretion. This office's principal
consular officer is extremely cautious of Mexican documentation
and has circulated an intra-office memo requiring special proce-
dures to ensure authentic documentation when the applicant has
a Latin American name.283
Marriage Fraud
Marriage fraud is a continuing source of ineligibility although
less so since the disruption of organized marriage fraud rings.28 4
Nonetheless, the Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, consulate uncovered
eighteen bigamists during a six-month period.285 Like other spe-
cific types of fraud, marriage fraud receives little treatment in the
interpretative materials to the Departmental regulations. In con-
sulates other than Vancouver, Canada, and Monterrey, Mexico,
each consular officer informally develops methods of uncovering
marriage fraud.286
A marriage of convenience may enable an applicant to obtain
preference status as an immediate relative.2 87 A grant of pre-
ferred status is often crucial to an alien's hopes of immigration.
Under the numerical limitation, visas are often unavailable to
281. Visa Section, U.S. Consulate at Monterrey, Mexico, Immigrant Visa Officer
Handbook (United States consulate in Monterrey, Mexico).
282. One author reviewed the file. One case involved a visa fixer (virtually any-
one assisting aliens in the preparation of their applications, but primarily one who
provides fraudulent documents) who worked out of a camper truck in the park
next to the consulate. When the INS apprehended the fixer while in the United
States, his records indicated sales of at least 162 blank Texas birth certificates at
prices ranging anywhere from $500 to $1,000 each. The fixer was convicted and
sentenced to 13 years in prison. Many of his customers were discovered and de-
ported.
283. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Vancou-
ver, Canada (Aug. 8, 1977).
284. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Monter-
rey, Mexico (July 21, 1977).
285. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico (July 8, 1977).
286. For example, consular officers typically ask the applicant for background
information about any children of the petitioning spouse, including names and
ages.
287. L & N. Act § 204(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c) (1976); 22 C.F.R. § 42.40 (1977).
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non-preference immigrants.2 88 A certain percentage of visa num-
bers are allocated for each preference category, leaving few num-
bers available for non-preference immigrants.2 8 9 In most
circumstances non-preference immigrants must also obtain labor
certifications. 290 However, the Act excludes spouses and other im-
mediate relatives of United States citizens from the numerical
limitations.29 1
Departmental regulations state that upon receipt of an INS-ap-
proved petition, consular officers are authorized to grant the pre-
ferred status the petition indicates. 292 The interpretative notes to
the Foreign Affairs Manual state that an approved petition estab-
lishes prima facie the validity of the indicated status.293 New evi-
dence is not required unless a question arises.94 Yet an INS
petition does not relieve the alien of the burden of proving visa
eligibility to the satisfaction of the consular officer.295 Thus, a
consular officer may suspend action and request INS revocation
of the petition if he knows or has reason to believe that the appli-
cant obtained approval of the petition by fraud or that the alien
beneficiary is not otherwise entitled to preferred status.2 96
Consular officers consider many factors in determining whether
the marriage of an applicant claiming preferred status is valid.
Factors include the disparity of the spouses' ages, whether they
have had prior marriages, the number of children by prior mar-
riages, and the length of time the spouses have cohabited.297 At
the consulate in Tijuana, Mexico, a primary consideration is
whether the couple have had children.298 Many officers in Mexico
believe that cultural norms dictate certain marital behavior and
that non-conformists are, therefore, suspicious. Examples of non-
288. Immigrant Visasfor October 1977, VISA Off. BUL., October, 1977, reprinted
in 54 INTERPRETER RELEASES 334 (1977).
289. L & N. Act § 203(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (1976).
290. Id. § 212(a) (14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (14); 22 C.F.L § 42.91(a) (14) (1977).
291. I. & N. Act § 201(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1976).
292. 22 C.F.. § 42.40 (1977).
293. Manual, supra note 113, § 42.40 note 1.
294. Id.
295. 22 C.F.L § 42.40 (1977).
296. Id. § 42.43(a) (1).
297. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico (July 12, 1977); Interview with consular officer at the United States
consulate in Guadalajara, Mexico (Aug. 9, 1977).
298. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Tijuana,
Mexico (July 11, 1977).
conformists include young men who marry older women and
adult males in their late twenties who claim to have neither
spouse nor offspring in Mexico.
299
Absent documented proof of a fraudulent marriage, consular of-
ficers may not refuse visas under the marriage fraud provision re-
gardless of the number of factors present. As a result, officers
have adopted interrogation techniques designed both to uncover
the fraud and to cajole applicants and spouses into admitting it.300
Applying these techniques, officers interview the applicant and
his spouse separately. Typically, officers ask each spouse to de-
scribe the circumstances under which the couple met, the decor
in the couple's living quarters, or who sleeps on which side of the
bed. If the alleged spouses' answers do not match, an officer will
confront the petitioning spouse with charges of a sham marriage.
Finally, even if an officer cannot prove marriage fraud, he may
still refuse a visa under certain circumstances. In one case at the
consulate in Monterrey, Mexico, the consular officer refused the
visa under section 221(g) because he suspected marriage fraud.
The officer was suspicious because the applicant had no children
and her husband was not present. The applicant, who had trav-
eled from San Francisco for purposes of the interview, was given
an open appointment and told to return with her spouse.301
Perhaps because of the harsh techniques they must apply, con-
sular officers selectively enforce the marriage fraud ground for
visa denial. Some officers decline to challenge the validity of mar-
riages and accept the INS-approved petitions.302 Other officers
299. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico (July 12, 1977). In an interview observed at the post in Tijuana, a
woman with six children claimed to be married to a man 19 years her junior. The
husband was the applicant. The woman had been on welfare for the last nine
years. She was unable to work because of arthritis. The woman lived in the
United States with her husband for one year, after which he was sent back to
Mexico. While in Mexico he never sent any money to the woman. The consular
officer asked the woman why she married a man 19 years younger than she. The
officer's main concern was that the husband would leave the woman as soon as he
received a visa. The woman assured the officer that her husband loved her. The
officer denied the visa because of the absence of a job offer, but the issue of mar-
riage fraud was resolved in the woman's favor. The officer commented about the
marriage afterward: "What can you do without an investigation?" Interview be-
tween visa applicant and consular officer at the United States consulate in Ti-
juana, Mexico (July 12, 1977).
300. Interview between visa applicant and consular officer at the United States
consulate in Monterrey, Mexico (July 20, 1977). One author observed the interro-
gation technique.
301. Interview between visa applicant and consular officer at the United States
consulate in Monterrey, Mexico (July 19, 1977). For a discussion of § 221(g), see
notes 81-109 and accompanying text supra.
302. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico (July 12, 1977).
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delay issuing a visa pending the results of an INS marriage inves-
tigation.303 Finally, two posts with a high incidence of fraud have
developed intra-office guidelines on marriage fraud detection and
are specialized in identifying sham marriages. The Vancouver,
Canada, consulate, for example, has defined certain situations
when the spouses must be interviewed separately even if the in-
terviewing officer suspects no fraud. 04 The consulate in Monter-
rey, Mexico, has a reputation among consular officers in Mexico
for its success in uncovering fraudulent marriages.
3 05
In determining the validity of other claims of preferred status,
the effect given to INS-approved petitions differs among consul-
ates and consular officers. Most consulates in Canada and Mexico
probably accept without question the status indicated by the INS
if for no other reason than lack of time for further investigation.
According to officers at the United States Embassy in Mexico
City, for example, it is informal policy to assume that the INS in-
vestigated sufficiently. 06 The same is true in Canada, and unless
the consular officer is aware of circumstances unknown to the
INS, he will not send the petition back to the INS for further re-
view.3 07 Ordinarily, an officer has neither need nor time to be
overly suspicious of the relationship between the petitioner and
the alien applicant.
303. One author observed such a case in Toronto, Canada. In that instance an
Iraqi had come to Canada on a non-immigrant visa. The day after he arrived he
married an American citizen whom he had met at Niagara Falls. During the immi-
grant-visa interview the consular officer discovered a fact unknown to the INS:
The applicant had a relative who lived next door to the "wife" in Chicago. The
consular officer, positive that this was an arranged marriage, had the applicant
sign an affidavit swearing that this marriage was his first. The officer then re-
turned the petition to the INS for further investigation. Interview with consular
officer at the United States consulate in Toronto, Canada (July 27, 1977).
304. An office memo circulated at the Vancouver, Canada, consulate makes sep-
arate interviews of the husband and wife mandatory if certain factors appear. For
example, if the wife is five or more years older than the husband and one of the
parties is of Latin American descent, or if the applicant has remarried an original
spouse after a brief marriage to a United States citizen, the consulate requires a
thorough investigation. Interview with consular officer at the United States consu-
late in Vancouver, Canada (Aug. 8, 1977); Memo from Vancouver, Canada, consu-
late (June 7, 1977) (on file With the San Diego Law Review).
305. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico (July 12, 1977).
306. Interviews with consular officers at the United States Embassy in Mexico
City, Mexico (July 26 - Aug. 3, 1977).
307. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Toronto,
Canada (July 22, 1977).
Other consulates undertake more demanding review. Officers
at the Monterrey, Mexico, consulate frequently challenge relation-
ships indicated by the INS-approved petitions.30 8 For this reason,
Monterrey personnel allege that they perform INS's investigative
work.309 Officers at the Vancouver, Canada, consulate also closely
scrutinize petitioner-applicant relationships.310 The high inci-
dence of fraudulent claims at that post and the large number of
California-resident Mexicans applying for visas at Vancouver
have caused the officers to apply such scrutiny.311 Officers at
other consulates where similar rates of fraud are suspected are
not nearly as diligent in questioning petitioner-applicant relation-
ships as are the Monterrey and Vancouver staffs.
Summary
The findings above illustrate that different consular officers and
consulates approach fraud in markedly different ways. Well-orga-
nized, high-fraud posts formulate their own internal guidelines for
uncovering fraud. An officer at such a post takes a highly active
role in probing for fraud. Thus, in cases of suspected marriage
fraud, he may demand the presence of both spouses and interro-
gate them intensively, but the visa may be refused and the appli-
cant put to delays and travel expense for the absent spouse.
Consular officers left to their own devices at other posts rarely re-
fuse to issue a visa on the ground of fraud. Some officers refuse
to concern themselves with marriage fraud. In these cases the
visa issues without delay.
Similarly, consular officers treat INS-approved petitions differ-
ently in determining whether to grant the applicant immediate
relative or preference status. The well-organized, high-fraud
posts take pride in challenging family relationships indicated in
INS-approved petitions. Informal policy at other consulates dic-
tates acceptance of INS-approved petitions at face value. Again,
in the former case an applicant may undergo hardship through
delay, added expense, or requests for additional evidence. In the
latter case no hardship is incurred.
308. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Monter-
rey, Mexico (July 20, 1977). It is impossible to document statistically the number
of applicants refused for fraudulent petitioner-applicant relationships because
consular officers often refuse for insufficient documentation, not for fraudulent re-
lationships. See notes 88-91 and accompanying text supra.
309. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Monter-
rey, Mexico (July 18, 1977).
310. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Vancou-
ver, Canada (Aug. 8, 1977).
311. Id.
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The examples of marriage fraud and the effect of INS-approved
petitions indicate that consular officers and consulates enforce
the fraud provision at their discretion. One reason for this selec-
tive enforcement is that the complex legal terminology used in
the general fraud guidelines often seems unintelligible to officers.
Specific types of fraud, such as marriage fraud, receive little or no
treatment in the Departmental guidelines. Like Departmental
policy under the public charge provision, Departmental policy
regulating the effect of an INS-approved petition seems contradic-
tory. An INS-approved petition supposedly establishes prima fa-
cie the validity of the family relationship indicated. Yet an alien
must still convince the individual consular officer of the relation-
ship's validity. Thus, Departmental attempts to structure consular
discretion under the fraud provision have been inadequate.
EVALUATION OF EXrRA-STATUTORY FACTORS AFFECTING THE
CONSULAR OFFICER'S DETERMINATION
The previous section examined the interactions between official
norms-the Immigration and Nationality Act, regulations promul-
gated under it, State Department interpretations, interpretative
guidelines-and the practical application of those norms by con-
sular officers. This section assesses unofficial factors that influ-
ence individual consular officers to arrive at decisions that vary
from those of other officers. First, the authors examine the consu-
lar officer's attitudes toward work, management, United States
immigration policy, and visa applicants. Second, the authors eval-
uate the effect of the officer's background and attitudes on his
decisionmaking.
The Effect of the Consular Officer's Personal Background upon the
Decisionmaking Process
The consular corps is an unusually young group of profession-
als. Of the consular officers returning the questionnaire, seventy
percent were under forty years of age.3 12 Apparently, individuals
do not remain long as immigrant visa officers but either are trans-
ferred within the Foreign Service or find new careers outside gov-
ernment.
312. Fifty-seven of the 82 consular officers filling out the questionnaire were
under 40.
Age affects the visa decisionmaking process in a number of
ways.313 The younger officer has greater difficulty detecting fraud
than do the older officers.314 The older officers are more inclined
to believe that outside pressure is a major hindrance to their
job.3 15 However, the younger officers more often stated that
outside pressure from Congressmen or from attorneys was likely
to affect their decisions.316
Fifty-two percent of the officers surveyed had been with the
Foreign Service for no more than five years.317 Sixty-four percent
of the officers had been issuing immigrant visas for fewer than
two years.318 This inexperience is attributed to the Departmental
policy of placing new officers in immigrant visa work.
The inexperienced consular officer is more apt to adhere strictly
to Departmental regulations in refusing visas even in situations in
which a more experienced consular officer would exercise discre-
tionary authority to grant visas.319 The refusal rates of the newer
313. The variable of age was broken down into two categories, those under 40
and those 40 or over. This variable was then cross-tabulated with answers to ques-
tions 1, 4, 5, 8, 15(h), (1), & (j). See Appendices A & B and computer printouts (on
file with the San Diego Law Review).
314. Twenty-four percent of those officers under 40, as opposed to 12% of those
40 or over, claimed that detecting fraud was a major problem. See Appendices A &
B, question 1 and computer printouts (on file with the San Diego Law Review).
315. Twenty-eight percent of the older officers felt congressional or attorney in-
quiries were a major problem. Only 14% of the younger officers stated that these
inquiries were a major problem.
316. Twenty-eight percent of those officers under 40, compared to only 12% of
the officers 40 or over, felt that pressure would affect their decisions. This finding
seems to imply that the older officers are less likely to succumb to political pres-
sure. However, although only 12% of the older officers felt that pressure affected
their decisions, 44% said that the equity of the immigration process was adversely
affected by such political pressure. Almost 58% of the officers under 40 felt the eq-
uity of the process to be affected in that such pressure would cause a visa to be
given preference. See Appendix A, questions 15(h), (i) and computer printouts
(on file with the San Diego Law Review).
317. See Appendix A, question 16(f). Researchers divided the variable "length
of time with the service" into two groups: those who had been with the service five
years or fewer and those who had been with the service over five years. The
length-of-service variable was then cross-tabulated with questions 1, 4, 5, 8, 11, 12,
15, & 15(a). See computer printouts (on file with the San Diego Law Review).
318. See Appendix A, question 16(a).
319. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Montreal,
Canada (July 15, 1977). The interviewee gave as an example of this statement a
situation in which a young consular officer refused a non-immigrant visa to a
member of a corporate board of directors. The director's theory was that because
the board meeting was to be held in the United States, the director would be "em-
ployed." The consular officer's superior thought that the officer could have exer-
cised his discretion to create an exception. In another case, a young consular
officer refused an immigrant visa under L & N. Act § 212(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(15) (1976), on the ground that an affidavit of support was insufficient evi-
dence. However, the visa was issued due to the prominence of the maker of the
affidavit. Interview, supra.
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officers are uniformly higher than those of the more experienced
officers.320 Conversely, in certain instances an officer who has
spent many years in the Service may become embittered toward
both the applicant and the immigration process. This attitude
may cause the officer to interpret the law and regulations strictly,
to the alien's disadvantage. 321
The questionnaire results show that slight differences in at-
titude exist between officers of longer tenure and newer officers.
Almost twice as many newer as more experienced officers
thought assisting applicants to be a major problem.322 Problems
related to explaining the law or to expediting the application pro-
cess were frequently cited. The less experienced officers were
more concerned with interference from Congressmen or from
other interested parties than were more experienced officers.
323
Significantly more of the seasoned employees thought that incom-
petent local employees were a source of difficulty.324
When asked the most frequent reason for denial of a visa, both
groups named the public charge provision. However, a signifi-
cantly larger percentage of the less experienced officers named
320. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Montreal,
Canada (July 14, 1977); Interview with consular officer at the United States consu-
late in Toronto, Canada (July 22, 1977). Larger offices often have several immi-
grant visa-issuing officers. The local employees, knowing the predilections of the
various officers to grant or deny visas, frequently distribute the files among the of-
ficers with this predisposition in mind. Applications that are likely to be refused
are delivered to a more lenient officer while only the clearest cases of eligibility
are consigned to the strict officer. The desired effect of this procedure is to avoid
excess work and paper flow-it takes considerably more time to deny a visa than
to grant one.
321. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Montreal,
Canada (July 17, 1977).
322. Thirty-nine percent of the newer officers, as opposed to 23% of the officers
who had been with the service six years or more, felt that thoroughly and compe-
tently assisting the aliens was one of the major problems they faced. See Appen-
dices A & B, question 1 and computer printouts (on file with the San Diego Law
Review).
323. Twenty percent of the newer officers found such pressure to be a problem
while such inquiries annoyed 13% of the more experienced officers. This result
could imply that the more experienced officers are hardened to such pressure and
do not take it as seriously as do the less experienced officers. Id. questions 15(h),
(i).
324. Twenty-one percent of the officers who had been with the service six years
or more found that incompetent or inadequately trained local employees were a
major problem. Only five percent of the newer officers had the same complaint.
Id. question 1.
this ground as the most frequent reason for denial.325 The data
showing which factors the different officers considered in refusing
the visa varied insignificantly. For example, similar percentages
of officers felt that age, ability to support oneself, or health were
relevant to the visa determination.
326
Finally, twice as many newer as more experienced officers be-
lieved that political inquiries in the form of letters or telephone
calls from Congressmen influenced their decisions.327 However,
both new and experienced officers found such pressure to be det-
rimental to the equity of the visa process.
328
Variation within the decisionmaking process is apparently not
caused by a difference in education. Virtually all the officers had
completed college, and sixty-six percent had completed some
graduate work.329 The more educated group found fair, impartial
interpretation and administration of the law to be a greater prob-
lem than did those with less education.3 30 Slightly more of the
college-educated group stated that assisting the applicants with
their applications was a major problem.
331
In response to the question of what, if any, non-statutory fac-
tors visa-issuing officers took into consideration, officers with dif-
ferent educational backgrounds exhibited little variation in their
answers. Similar percentages found willingness to work and the
credibility of the applicant to be relevant to their decisions. How-
ever, a slightly larger percentage of the more educated group of
officers believed that such non-statutory factors do affect the con-
325. Almost 39% of the experienced officers cited the public charge provision as
their most frequent ground of refusal in contrast with 46.5% of the newer officers.
This higher self-admitted refusal rate by the newer officers may be because they
are more stringent in their evaluation of the public charge evidence. Id. question
4.
326. For the various factors considered, see Appendix B, question 8.
327. Some 30.2% of the newer officers considered such pressure to be influen-
tial as opposed to 15.8% of the more experienced officers. Id. question 15(h).
328. Approximately 58% of the newer officers considered the pressure to be
detrimental. Fifty percent of the more experienced officers so viewed the effect of
the outside pressure. Id. question 15(i).
329. See Appendix A, question 16(i). The variable "education" was broken
down into two categories: those who had done some graduate work (17 years or
more of school) and those who had completed fewer than 17 years of school.
These two variables were then cross-tabulated with questions 1, 4, 5, 8, 11, & 12.
See computer printouts (on file with the San Diego Law Review).
330. Fourteen percent of those with fewer than 17 years of schooling stated that
impartial interpretation of the law was a problem. Twenty-nine percent of those
with 17 or more years of schooling saw this to be a major problem. See Appendix
A, question 1.
331. Thirty-nine percent of the less educated officers, as contrasted with 28% of
those with graduate education, stated that assisting the applicants was a major
problem. Id.
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sular officer's determination.332 Moreover, almost three times the
number of the college-educated officers denied considering non-
statutory factors than did the post-college-educated group.333
Thus, it appears that the more educated officers admitted utilizing
their discretion to a greater extent in allowing non-statutory fac-
tors to influence their decisions than did their counterparts with
only a college education.
Officers' Attitudes Toward Consular Work and Toward
Immigration Policy
Seventy-three percent of the officers claim to be pleased with
their work assignments. Similarly, seventy-five percent are happy
with the locations of their posts.334 However, these attitudes vary
with the location of the Foreign Service post and with the clien-
tele encountered. In an European post, most applicants are likely
to be professionals, whereas in a Mexican post many applicants
are poor, unskilled, and speak little English. Consular officers ad-
mit that the location of the post affects their attitudes toward the
applicants and toward their work.3 35
In Mexico, most consular officers are disappointed and frus-
trated with their work. The following comment is typical: "We
deal with the least attractive segment of the foreign community
and we sour quicker. Compared to political and economic officers,
consular officers are treated as second class citizens." 33 6 Con-
versely, in Canada most immigrant visa officers state that they en-
joy their work.337 These smaller Canadian posts are probably
332. Id. question 4.
333. Thirty-two percent of the officers with a college education or less totally
denied the use of non-statutory factors. Only 12% of those with graduate educa-
tion claimed the same.
334. See Appendix B, questions 16(c), (d).
335. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Monter-
rey, Mexico (July 18, 1977).
336. Interview with consular officer at the United States Embassy in Mexico
City, Mexico (Aug. 1, 1977). Another officer voices a similar opinion:
Mexico eats up junior officers. You get bloodied, fully indoctrinated.
I've seen more here in two years than most guys in Asia see in their entire
career. Morale is pretty good, but you get tired. All day long you're dash-
ing people's dreams. You think, who am I to do that? It's very tiring.
Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Monterrey, Mex-
ico (July 19, 1977).
337. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Halifax,
Canada (July 7, 1977). The large Canadian posts of Montreal and Toronto are
atypical for immigrant visa purposes because of the large number of stateside
more representative of a typical post.338
Many consular officers cited boredom as a problem. An enthu-
siastic young officer entering the consular corps expecting a vari-
ety of tasks may be disappointed to be placed in an immigrant
visa section where the work is normally routine and repeti-
tious.339 As a result, that officer is less likely to be probing and
may issue visas in all but the obviously ineligible cases. Some-
times the officers' ambitions are frustrated when they enter the
Foreign Service hoping to become political or economic officers
and instead are placed in the visa section.O
Regardless of the consular officers' views on the desirability of
the job, most officers appear to have sufficient professional pride
to prevent their attitudes from interfering with their work.341 Of-
ficers seldom acknowledge that satisfaction or dissatisfaction with
their work significantly affects the decision rendered.342 Still,
frustration and disappointment with the work affect office mo-
rale.3 4 3 Low morale affects an officer's willingness to work or to
accept responsibility for refusals.4 More important, however, is
the officer's attitude toward the immigration process. His attitude
may have a significant effect upon the decision rendered. Consu-
lar officers uniformly feel a sense of frustration and futility about
the realistic enforcement of the immigration laws. The impotence
of the immigration laws and of the consular officer's role with re-
spect to them is indicated by the geometrically increasing num-
cases entertained. As a result, aliens of every nationality apply at these posts. For
a discussion of stateside cases, see text accompanying notes 255-58 supra.
338. Interviews with numerous consular officers at United States consulates
throughout Canada (July-Aug., 1977).
339. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Toronto,
Canada (July 28, 1977). This officer, with a degree in psychology, thought consular
work would provide her with a variety of human encounters stimulating to the in-
tellect. She has found visa work to be mundane and is leaving the service.
340. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Winnipeg,
Canada (Aug. 2, 1977). This officer, a recent graduate of the Visa Office's Rosslyn
center training (see note 41 supra), was slated to be a political officer.
341. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Monter-
rey, Mexico (July 21, 1977). Interview with consular officer at the United States
consulate in Guadalajara, Mexico (Aug. 10, 1977). Both officers, economic officers,
were temporarily working in the visa sections due to the high workload and
insufficient number of visa officers.
342. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Halifax,
Canada (July 10, 1977).
343. With the exception of Monterrey, morale in most offices observed in Mex-
ico was poor. Interviews with numerous consular officers at United States consul-
ates throughout Mexico (July-Aug., 1977). In contrast, morale in the majority of
offices in Canada is high once the officers accept that the job they are doing is
nearly impossible. Interviews with numerous consular officers at United States
consulates throughout Canada (July-Aug., 1977).
344. See note 343 supra.
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bers of illegal aliens entering the United States each year.3 4 5
Moreover, provisions actually embodied in the law provide for
routine waiver of the officer's eligibility decision.
346
Consular officers disdain illegal aliens who obtain equities not
available to other applicants. For example, an alien who is ille-
gally present in the United States and marries an American citi-
zen is accorded immediate relative status and can immigrate
without reference to the numerical limitations imposed by the
quota system. Such an applicant receives the same treatment as
applicants who strictly comply with the immigration laws. Al-
though consular officers believe this result is unjust,347 the law
provides no penalties for circumvention of the immigration proc-
ess in this manner.m
These feelings of futility were expressed by a consular officer at
Guadalajara, Mexico: "Our work is a farce. I think the [State] De-
partment realizes this and that's why we don't get promoted, or
enough resources, or enough manpower. It's a nothing job."
349
Furthermore, officers estimate that ninety percent of all appli-
cants list a current address in the United States. Even if the ap-
plicants are refused a visa, officers believe the aliens will return
to live illegally in the United States.
35 0
345. In 1975, the INS Commissioner stated that the number of aliens smuggled
into the United States was double that of the previous year. Chapman, A Look at
illegal Immigration: Causes and Impact on the United States, 13 SAN DIEGo L.
REV. 34, 35 (1975).
346. Such waivers are granted to immediate relatives excluded on criminal,
fraudulent, or medical grounds. I. & N. Act § 212(g)-(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(g)-(i)
(1976). The Mexico City INS office handles approximately 60 waiver requests each
month, including all requests from Central America. The Monterrey, Mexico, INS
office processes about 100 requests per month. It is estimated that these INS of-
fices grant 90% of all waiver requests. Interview with Warren O'Neal, INS District
Director, United States Embassy, Mexico City, Mexico (Aug. 3, 1977).
347. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Halifax,
Canada (July 7, 1977); Interviews with consular officers at the United States consu-
late in Montreal, Canada (July 14-20, 1977); Interviews with consular officers at the
United States consulate in Toronto, Canada (July 24, 1977).
348. Unless the consular officer can verify that the intent to defraud was pres-
ent at the time the applicant applied for the non-immigrant visa, no detrimental
consequence accrues to the alien for having lived illegally in the United States. L
& N. Act § 212(a) (19), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (19) (1976).
349. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Guadala-
jara, Mexico (Aug. 12, 1977).
350. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico (July 12, 1977).
Because of their frustration, many consular officers become em-
bittered toward the immigration process. As a result, some of-
ficers use their authority to interpret strictly the immigration law
against the alien whenever possible.351 This attitude may cause
the officer to attempt to force the applicant to admit fraud and
then refuse the visa.352 He may require the applicant to meet
stringent standards of financial sufficiency. 353 More commonly,
however, consular officers resign themselves to the impossibility
of proper enforcement of the Act.
In Canada the feeling of futility is enhanced by the prevalence
of the "stateside" cases.3M A "stateside" applicant who has been
illegally residing in the United States is entitled to apply for a
visa in Canada. Regardless of whether the visa is denied, the
alien is allowed to return to the United States. This practice rein-
forces the consular officers' view that the immigration process is
illogical.
The effect of denying "stateside" visas has been described by
one consular officer as a "no-win" situation.355 Most of the state-
side cases that are denied are refused on public charge
grounds. 6 However, the alien can legally neither obtain a job to
overcome the ineligibility without a visa nor obtain a visa without
a job. Because he is allowed to return to the United States with-
out the visa, the only effect of refusal is to keep the alien in the
same low economic position. The result of this predicament is
that consular officers grant visas to many of these "stateside"
cases when they might deny them to similar applicants else-
where. The solution of one consular officer in Canada is to issue
a visa whenever he believes that the applicant could return with
the required document necessary to establish eligibility or that
the applicant would be granted a routine waiver.357 In Winnipeg,
Canada, one officer considers whether the alien will be a danger
351. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Monter-
rey, Mexico (July 19, 1977).
352. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Montreal,
Canada (July 19, 1977).
353. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Montreal,
Canada (July 14, 1977).
354. See text accompanying notes 255-58 supra.
355. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Montreal,
Canada (July 19, 1977).
356. Id.
357. Interviews with consular officer at a United States consulate in Canada
(1977). One author observed several interviews in which the alien presented no
evidence that he would not become a public charge. Nonetheless, these aliens re-
ceived visas.
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to the United States.358 If he determines that the alien will not
present a danger, he normally will issue the visa.35 9 This officer
believes he thus furthers the purpose of excluding undesirable
aliens while avoiding strict adherence to unrealistic rules and reg-
ulations.
60
In Mexico many officers describe their consulates as "visa
mills."1361 One officer described the Ciudad Juarez consulate as
"merely a holding station."362 He stated that Mexican nationals
come to Ciudad Juarez to apply for visas and at the same time
enter the United States illegally to work. This officer's view en-
hances his tendency to be lenient when issuing visas.
Thus, the effect of consular officers' attitudes toward the immi-
gration process varies with individual officers and seems to ac-
count for some of the different decisions on visa applications.
Some officers strictly interpret the immigration law and regula-
tions in each case while other officers are more lenient in an at-
tempt to apply the law with greater fairness and impartiality. The
authors observed such a lenient approach in Canada and in Mex-
ico, where the majority of officers grant visas liberally because of
the impracticality of denial.
Consular Officers' Attitudes Toward Applicants
Although the applicants at each post vary, there are certain
similarities among them. In Mexico, the majority of applicants
358. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Winnipeg,
Canada (Aug. 3,1977).
359. Exceptions involve refusals on the "permanent grounds" of drug abuse or
of subversive activity. In these cases, the consular officer cannot issue the visa.
The officer at Winnipeg has suggested to the State Department that the rule of
mandatory denial for marijuana convictions be discarded. Id. See L & N. Act § 212
(a) (23), (28), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (23), (28) (1976). See Manual, supra note 113, §
42.91(a) (23) note 2 (distinguishing "use" from "possession." The former does not
render the applicant ineligible).
360. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Winnipeg,
Canada (Aug. 2, 1977). This officer believes his job as a consular officer includes
exercising his judgment. He will not strictly interpret the law if, by doing so, he
will reach what he considers an unjust result The philosophy of the chief consu-
lar officer at Winnipeg is reflected in the post's low refusal rate, which was approx-
imately five percent during the 12-month period from July 15, 1976, through June
15, 1977. This norm is in direct contrast to the 30-60% refusal rates reported at
each Mexican post.
361. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico (July 12, 1977).
362. Id.
are similarly situated economically. Most have little, if any, for-
mal education and speak little English.363 Many applicants have
illegally resided in the United States.3 64 Although illegal resi-
dence is seldom to the applicant's disadvantage,3 65 some consular
officers do not favorably view such aliens.
Some officers in Mexico take a harsh view of applicants,
describing them as dirty, smelly, lazy, and prone to crime and
welfare.3 66 Consular officers adopting this view deny that they
discriminate against these applicants, rationalizing that the law
does not allow for such considerations. In comparison, officers in
Mexico City believe that the typical applicant there is more quali-
fied for a visa than are applicants in other areas of Mexico. Mex-
ico City officials claim that this fact results in a lower refusal rate
for their post.367
Most consular officers in Mexico assume that the majority of ap-
plicants commit some form of fraud in their visa applications. 368
Therefore, documents of Mexican applicants are examined more
closely for fraud than are the documents submitted by applicants
of other nationalities. This careful scrutiny also takes place in the
Vancouver, Canada, office, where a large number of Mexicans ap-
ply for visas. 3
69
Some consular officers consider themselves guardians of the
United States' borders.37 0 Such an attitude causes a strict exami-
nation of Mexican applications. 37 1 One officer stated that he be-
lieves Mexican immigrants do not contribute to a better United
363. Id.
364. See also text accompanying notes 347-48 supra.
365. See id.
366. Interviews with various consular officers at United States consulates in
Mexico (July 7 - Aug. 12, 1977). Some consular officers use the pejorative "trash"
to refer to Mexican applicants. Id.
367. Interview with consular officer at the United States Embassy in Mexico
City, Mexico (Aug. 2, 1977).
368. Consular officers suspect that virtually all applicants are deceitful in some
way. Sometimes fraud is blatant; at other times the applicant feigns forgetfulness.
Interviews with consular officers at the United States consulate in Ciudad Juarez,
Mexico (July 8-14, 1977). One highly skeptical officer said: "I've never seen a Mexi-
can document that indicated anything bad about an applicant. Nothing. I've never
seen a police letter implicate a Mexican." Interview with consular officer at the
United States consulate in Guadalajara, Mexico (Aug. 10, 1977). See text accompa-
nying notes 269-72 supra.
369. This office has instigated special procedures for detecting both documen-
tary and other fraud when the applicant is of Latin American descent. Memo from
Vancouver, Canada, consulate (June 7, 1977) (on fie with the San Diego Law
Review).
370. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Guadala-
jara, Mexico (Aug. 8, 1977).
371. Id.
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States society.3
7 2
The consular officers' attitudes toward applicants in Canada de-
pend on whether the applicants are Canadian or "stateside"
cases. Native Canadians are generally viewed favorably and are
assumed to be honest.373 Presumably, their desire to enter the
United States is not as compelling as that of many Mexicans be-
cause Canada is a politically stable and an economically affluent
country. They need not immigrate solely to survive, as do many
Mexicans. Consequently, consular officers examine Canadian ap-
plicants less closely for fraud than they do applicants of most
other nationalities. 374 Officers believe that if a Canadian is not
prosperous in the United States, he will return to Canada rather
than apply for public assistance in the United States. 375
A consular officer's opinion of "stateside" applicants is probably
similar to his view of Mexican applicants. However, these opin-
ions do not usually lead to denial of visas. Although officers are
resentful and suspicious of "stateside" applicants and may inves-
tigate these applications more thoroughly, the futility of denying
such applications often causes officers to issue the visas regard-
less of their opinions of the applications' merits.376
Attitudes Toward Management
In the consular offices, as in any administrative agency, the
quality of management has an important impact on the visa pro-
cess. Each of the larger consulates has a Visa Section Chief.377
372. Interview with consular officer at a United States consulate in Mexico
(1977). This officer believes that Mexicans are not making a contribution to soci-
ety and that Congress is reluctant to do anything because of the ever-increasing
Mexican-American constituency. The officer equated the problem of controlling il-
legal aliens with the United States approach in the Vietnam War, i.e., trying to
please everyone but not satisfying anyone. He opines, "If we're going to fight the
illegal aliens, then let's fight to win." Id.
373. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Winnipeg,
Canada (Aug. 3, 1977).
374. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Halifax,
Canada (July 7, 1977). While in the Halifax, Canada, office on July 7, 1977, one au-
thor observed a Canadian with an American spouse applying for a visa as an im-
mediate relative. The consular officer granted the visa, regarding as slight public
charge evidence a bank account with a balance of $1,256. The officer admitted that
had the spouses been of different nationalities than they were, she might have de-
nied the visa. Id.
375. Id.
376. See notes 255-58 and accompanying text supra.
377. In 68% of the offices answering the questionnaire there was only one im-
Under the supervision of the Chief are the supervisors for the im-
migrant and non-immigrant visa sections. The immigrant visa su-
pervisor issues visas himself and has daily contact with the rank-
and-Me immigrant visa-issuing officers at the post.
The role of the visa supervisor varies at each office. In some of-
fices, he may actively participate with the staff officers in the
issuance of visas. Through the use of intra-office memos, in! ,r-
pretative regulations, and free exercise of his review powers, the
supervisor may gain firm control over the immigrant visa
operation.378 In other offices, the supervisor may become dis-
illusioned, disinterested, or lazy and may refuse to entertain in-
quiries from other officers, thus providing little assistance to his
visa-issuing staff.
379
An officer who is not trained in visa work is likely to be an inef-
fective supervisor. Nevertheless, an administrative officer may be
designated as the supervisory consular officer at a post even
though he is unfamiliar with immigration law. Thus, a young visa-
issuing officer in such a consulate may have no one to turn to for
advice. Moreover, because it is difficult for one with no expertise
in the field to render a decision, meaningful review is uncommon
and hence is effectively denied.38
0
Over eighty percent of the consular officers stated that manage-
ment at their consulates could be improved.3 8 1 However, the of-
ficer's attitude toward post management and its effect upon the
visa process differs according to the role the supervising officer
takes. An active supervisor will gain respect not only from his
own officers but from officers throughout the nation in which his
post is located. These officers will seek his advice.382 Respected
migrant visa officer. Appendix B, question 2(c). When there is no visa section
chief, the visa decisions are reviewed, if at all, by an officer who normally does not
issue immigrant visas. Interview with consular officer at the United States consu-
late in Halifax, Canada (July 7, 1977).
378. The Visa Section Chief at the United States consulate in Montreal, Ca-
nada, practices these methods of control. This officer also helps with the visa pro-
cess by interviewing applicants and by investigating both immigrant and non-
immigrant visas, a task that few Visa Section Chiefs undertake. One of the au-
thors observed this process in the Montreal office.
379. Interview with consular officer at a United States consulate in Canada
(1977). One officer stated that often the State Department will transfer such an
officer to an innocuous post where it is felt he will do little harm rather than cause
an officer to retire or quit.
380. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Halifax,
Canada (July 9, 1977).
381. Eleven percent of the officers said management could be greatly improved,
while 71% stated some improvement could be made. See Appendix B, question
2(e).
382. Often officers seek advice from Montreal, Canada, rather than from the De-
partment of State Visa Office when they need quick clarification on a point of law.
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management influences less experienced officers' decisions. The
inexperienced consular officer may be inclined to agree with the
supervisor's philosophy or approach to issuing visas.383 An active
supervisor sets a good example that the other officers will follow.
Poor and disrespected management within a consulate is detri-
mental to efficiency because newer officers have only incompetent
officers to look to for guidance. Similarly, the efficiency of the of-
fice will suffer if the supervisor is unwilling to perform his share
of the work.3 4
Many consular officers believe that they receive too much criti-
cism from the State Department for the immigration problems in
the United States. These officers claim that one can find the
source of the immigration dilemma in the State Department's fail-
ure to employ competent officers and to provide them with better
guidance.3 8 5 Some consular officers believe that the Visa Office's
officer training is inadequate both in quality and in time. Some of
the surveyed officers had received only two weeks of formal train-
ing. One officer stated that consular officers should be required to
take legal courses.3 8 6
Guidance from the Visa Office in the form of advisory opinions
and of interpretative guidelines often comes too late to be of ser-
vice.38 7 Because the Visa Office is not familiar with overseas
problems, State Department guidance often is not useful.38 8 The
Visa Office in Washington, D.C., often has little idea of what tran-
spires at different foreign posts.38 9
383. This appeared to be the case in Winnipeg, Canada, where the liberal phi-
losophy of the Chief of the Visa Section had been somewhat instilled in a novice
officer. Interviews with consular officer at the United States consulate in Winni-
peg, Canada (Aug. 2, 1977).
384. Interviews with consular officer at the United States consulate in Toronto,
Canada (July 15, 1977). Officers admitted that inefficient superiors affected their
own efficiency.
385. Interview with consular officer at the United States Embassy in Mexico
City, Mexico (Aug. 2, 1977).
386. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Toronto,
Canada (July 26, 1978).
387. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Toronto,
Canada (July 27, 1978). This officer absolutely refuses to ask for State Department
advice on questions of fact. He believes that he is in a better position to judge the
merits of each case. He states that interpretative guidance from the Visa Office is
outdated and that he relies on releases from the Association of Immigration and
Nationality Lawyers for guidance.
388. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Halifax,
Canada (July 10, 1977).
389. For example, the State Department conducts annual inspections of the Ti-
It is the opinion of at least one officer that political inquiries to
the State Department from attorneys and Congressmen regarding
their clients and constituents deter consular officers from thor-
ough investigation of some cases.390 This deterrence comes to
bear on the officer in the form of pressure to issue visas.39' An
officer with a high refusal rate is often last in line for a promotion
as a result of State Department pressure to issue visas.
392
Finally, inadequate officer staffing of consular offices is a prob-
lem. Almost half the consular officers stated that their perform-
ance could improve if the number of officers were increased.39 3
Proper performance of necessary visa investigations is impossible
because lack of personnel renders the available time inadequate
for the job.
The Effect of the Promotion System upon the Visa Decision
Consular officers frequently complain that prospects for ad-
vancement beyond the middle grades of the Foreign Service are
poor.3 9 4 Many officers believe that a tour of duty in Mexico is a
blemish on their careers. One officer put it bluntly: "Hacking
visas is not a feather in your cap. Mexican posts are a blot on
your record. Of four in my training class assigned to Mexico, none
has been promoted."395 Without the promotion incentive, many
officers lose enthusiasm and interest. Of greater concern, they
lose the sense of the importance of their work both for the indi-
vidual applicants and for the United States. As a result, many of-
ficers exhibit less willingness to bear their shares of the workload
and may leave the service after a relatively short time. As one of-
ficer states: "A lot of officers on their second or third tour do half
of what they could do because they are going to leave anyway. '396
Despite the belief that advancement is rare, many consular of-
ficers deny that lack of promotion opportunities has any effect on
juana and other Mexican posts, but the inspectors have no knowledge of the visa
process. Consequently, their cursory inspection reveals little. Rarely do inspec-
tors speak with the officers in any depth.
390. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Halifax,
Canada (July 10, 1977).
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Forty-five percent of the officers answering the questionnaire stated that
their performance would improve if more officers were assigned to their posts.
See Appendix B, question 2(d).
394. Interviews with consular officers at the United States consulate in Guada-
lajara and the Embassy in Mexico City, Mexico (July 26 - Aug. 12, 1977).
395. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Guadala-
jara, Mexico (Aug. 12, 1977).
396. Interview with consular officer at the United States Embassy in Mexico
City, Mexico (July 28, 1977).
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their decisions to leave the Service. However, they make one no-
table exception-the Chief Consular Officer's report. The Chief
Consular Officer evaluates each consular officer yearly. He for-
wards the report to the State Department, which reviews each re-
port and evaluates each officer's performance. Differing
philosophies of visa issuance and denial between the Chief Of-
ficer and the consular officer may influence the Chief Officer's
evaluation report.3 97 Thus, the immigrant visa officers are en-
couraged to maintain attitudes toward their work that are consis-
tent with those of their superior officers.398 This influence may
account for a variation in visa refusal rates among different For-
eign Service posts, but it does not explain varying decisions
among individual officers in the same post.
The Lack of Time as a Factor upon a Decision
Inadequate time to investigate greatly affects the visa-issuing
process. Twenty-six percent of the officers claim that they have
inadequate time to review the high volume of cases.399 Although
one officer believed that his allotted time was adequate, most of-
ficers agree that time pressures influence their decisions.40 0 In
the busier offices each consular officer considers twenty-five to
thirty visa applications per day.401 More than half the officers
work more than forty hours per week.
40 2
Forty-three percent of the survey respondents stated that appli-
397. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Toronto,
Canada (July 22, 1977). Apparently, only complimentary comments cause the
State Department to look with favor on a consular officer when considering his
promotion-a report devoid of such comments has the same effect as one that con-
tains unfavorable remarks. Id.
398. Id.
399. The high volume of cases relative to the time allotted was the second most
frequently cited problem by the officers. The most commonly cited problem was
the job of helping the aliens understand and expedite the applications. See Ap-
pendices A & B, question 1.
400. Interviews with consular officers at the United States consulate in Tijuana,
Mexico (July - Aug., 1977).
401. In the Toronto, Canada, office each officer is scheduled 25-30 interviews per
day. Each officer in Montreal sees a similarly high volume of applicants daily. In-
terviews with consular officers at the United States consulates in Montreal and in
Toronto, Canada (July 14-28, 1977).
402. Fifty-four percent of the officers claim to work over 40 hours per week.
Twenty-four percent work a 45-hour week and 8% work 50 hours. One consular
officer states that he works a 64-hour week. See Appendix B, question 2(a).
cant interviews typically last from ten to twenty minutes. 403 Al-
though local employees are an invaluable aid in screening
documentation, the consular officer still must review all docu-
ments, interview the applicant, and make his decision in a matter
of minutes. Because refusals must be thoroughly documented
and reasons stated, time limitations prevent thorough investiga-
tion of possibly fraudulent claims. 0 4 Moreover, persistent inquir-
ies from Congressmen and attorneys compete with applicants for
the officers' time.405
These time constraints have two consequences. First, the of-
ficer cannot investigate documents or job letters. The officer often
must make a subjective judgment of the profferred document's
validity. This judgment may be inaccurate. Second, the officer
will be less likely to consider each applicant's individual circum-
stances when time is limited. Thus, individualized justice is hin-
dered.
The Effect of Intermediaries
Often the application process involves individuals other than
the applicant. The applicant may retain an attorney to help him
immigrate. He might hire a lay consultant to inform him of any
obstacles he must overcome. A relative or friend within the
United States may write to a Congressman who then becomes in-
volved in the process through direct correspondence with the con-
sular officer. Consular officers generally resent inquiries from
Congressmen because they consider Congressmen to be ignorant
in the field of immigration law.4 06 Congressional inquiries deter
the officers from devoting time where needed--examination of the
403. Twelve percent of the officers conducted five-minute interviews. See Ap-
pendix B, question 3(c). In Toronto, Canada, interviews are scheduled every 15
minutes. Similarly, in Montreal, Canada, interviews are scheduled approximately
every 20 minutes. In the smaller offices visited, the interviews are held at longer
intervals, but the officers have duties other than the issuance of immigrant visas.
404. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Halifax,
Canada (July 8, 1977). One officer stated that if enough time were allowed for in-
vestigation, most visas could be refused on grounds of fraud. Id.
405. Twenty-six percent of the officers stated such interference was one of the
major problems of being an immigrant visa officer. See Appendix B, question 1.
406. The procedure for handling such "congressionals" varies within each of-
fice. See notes 136-38 and accompanying text supra. In some offices, notably Mon.
treal and Winnipeg, Canada, the job of responding to congressional inquiries is
delegated to the local employees. Interviews with consular officers at the United
States consulate in Montreal, Canada (July 14-20, 1977); Interviews with consular
officers at the United States consulate in Winnipeg, Canada (Aug. 3-5, 1977). In
other offices, the consular officers themselves answer the correspondence. It
would appear to be a more efficient use of time to leave the job of responding to
these often uninformed inquiries to the local employees and thus to allow the con-
sular officer more time for more crucial matters.
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immigrant visa applications.40 7
The effects of congressional inquiries on the decision regarding
a particular application varies. Ordinarily the inquiries prompt a
check on the officer's decision and result in a second considera-
tion of the application. 40 8 This second examination can either re-
inforce the officer's decision or cause him to change it. He might
uncover new facts that may cause him to issue a visa that he
might have denied without the closer scrutiny.0 9 Conversely, this
second look may reveal factors unfavorable to an applicant, lead-
ing to a visa refusal when upon cursory review the visa would
have been issued.410 Many officers believe that such congres-
sional interest affects the equity of the immigration process be-
cause it may cause visas to be issued improperly.411
"The relationship between a lawyer and the consular officer in
the visa-issuing process must be considered adversarial, in the
sense that if you [the attorney] err, you and your client will be
cut to ribbons."412 Consular officers and attorneys exhibit a mu-
tual attitude of distrust and disrespect toward each other.413
407. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Toronto,
Canada (July 23, 1978).
408. Twenty percent of the officers stated that the result of a congressional in-
quiry is to cause them to give extra time to an application. See Appendix B, ques-
tion 15(i) (1).
409. Eleven percent of the officers stated that the effect of congressional pres-
sure was to influence them to issue a visa that they might otherwise have denied.
See Appendix B, question 15(i) (1).
410. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Montreal,
Canada (July 15, 1977).
411. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Toronto,
Canada (July 23, 1977). Fifty-three to 54 % of the officers felt that such pressure
adversely affects the equity of the system primarily because it causes certain ap-
plications to be treated more favorably than others. See Appendices A & B, ques-
tion 15(i). One officer views the effect of congressional inquiry as follows: "The
tendency is to be quite liberal. You are forced to be. I used to think that when I
refused an applicant I could support it. But the Senators and Congressmen jump
all over you. Kennedy's staff was just terrible in Canada." Interview with consu-
lar officer at the United States consulate in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico (July 12, 1977).
412. Letter from Sam Williamson to Kim R. Anderson (Oct. 27, 1977) (on file
with the San Diego Law Review). One officer opined, "All attorneys are crooks,"
explaining that an attorney in New York City has been indicted 79 times, but as of
July, 1977, was still informing aliens "how to fraudulently gain access." Interview
with consular officer at the United States consulate in Halifax, Canada (July 7,
1977).
413. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Montreal,
Canada (July 17, 1977). Officers stated that attorneys coach applicants on certain
answers to avoid a decision of ineligibility. The most commonly cited example
was to the question, "Why did you apply for the non-immigrant visa?" The pre-
In certain circumstances the mere retention of an attorney af-
fects the determination of the visa application. In Ciudad Juarez,
Mexico, active representation by an attorney raises the consular
officers' suspicions.4 14 Similarly, in Vancouver, Canada, and in
Monterrey, Mexico, representation by a specific attorney causes
more thorough investigation.4 15 However, attorneys are useful in
completing the visa application and in obtaining documents.416 In
this respect, representation by an attorney may avoid a refusal for
insufficient documentation.4 17 In Mexico City, attorneys' inquiries
can cause an applicant's visa to be processed more rapidly. How-
ever, most consular officers agree that attorneys are unnecessary,
that they often serve to induce fraudulent claims, 418 and that they
are a nuisance and a hindrance to the effective enforcement of the
immigration law.
"Visa fixers" or other lay consultants do a thriving business and
are a continuing source of irritation to consular officers. 419 "Visa
fixers" include immigration consultants, notary publics, and orga-
nized groups such as the Catholic Conference. 420 For example, in
ferred answer is "vacation" when an alien has entered the United States on a non-
immigrant visa, has since established entitlement (usually through marriage to a
United States citizen), and is now applying for an immigrant visa. If it can be
proved that at the time of application for the non-immigrant visa the alien had the
intention of permanently residing in the United States, the applicant may be ex-
cluded under the fraud provision, L & N. Act § 212(a) (19), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(19)
(1976). Hence, prior coaching by an attorney to reply "vacation" will avoid this re-
sult.
414. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico (July 8, 1977).
415. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Vancou-
ver, Canada (Aug. 9, 1977). An office memo stated that all applicants represented
by a certain attorney should be sent to the Seattle office of the INS for investiga-
tion during the pre-examination stage. Memo from Vancouver, Canada, consulate
(June 7, 1977) (on file with the San Diego Law Review). The Monterrey, Mexico,
office maintains a list of unscrupulous attorneys, and consular officers carefully in-
spect the applications of these attorneys' clients. Interview with consular officer at
the United States consulate in Monterrey, Mexico (July 18, 1977).
416. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Montreal,
Canada (July 18, 1977).
417. The financial cost to the alien for this paper shuffling is exorbitant. Attor-
neys' fees range from $500 to $1,500. "We could set up an office in Brownsville
right now and make a million dollars in six months." Interview with consular of-
ficer at the United States consulate in Monterrey, Mexico (July 19, 1977).
418. Interview with consular officer at the United States Embassy in Mexico
City, Mexico (Aug. 1, 1977).
419. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Monter-
rey, Mexico (July 18, 1977).
420. The immigration field is a complex one, and there are not enough compe-
tent attorneys in the United States to handle the workload. However, at present
the law excludes lay persons from acting as immigration specialists for hire, 8
C.F.R. § 292.1 (1978). Immigration consultants see the solution in creating a licens-
ing board to allow lay persons to counsel aliens while ensuring that professional
standards are upheld. Immigration attorneys are opposed to the idea and believe
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Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, the El Paso offices of the Catholic Confer-
ence constantly mail letters and call consular officers. The Con-
ference demands favored treatment and regards the sole purpose
of the immigration law as being the reunification of families. 42 ' In
Monterrey, Mexico, one "visa fixer" until recently worked openly
in a park near the consulate. He accounted for the sale of fraudu-
lent documents to 166 known clients.422 In Guadalajara, Mexico,
the consulate felt compelled to make discreet inquiries into ad-
vertisements from local attorneys who claimed to guarantee visas
for a price. The price was considerable, but as one attorney ex-
plained, the price was necessary to bribe the consular officers.4 2 3
Summary
Through the use of a multi-method research technique,42 4 the
authors have identified several factors that influence the discre-
tionary issuance of visas. One factor is the personal background
of the consular officer.4 5 Other factors include the effect of in-
termediaries, 42 6 lack of time,427 and the promotion system.428 Fi-
nally, the consular officer's attitudes toward management, 42 9
applicants, 430 and immigration policy43 1 affect his visa decisions.
RECOMMENDATIONS
This section presents the authors' recommendations to mini-
mize consular discretionary authority to issue and refuse immi-
the possibilityof inferior work would be increased through the use of lay consul-
tants. L. Daily Journal, Feb. 7, 1978, at 1, col. 6.
As a result of this controversy, the California Assembly passed a bill to regulate
consultants in February, 1978. The bill limits consultants to filling out forms but
establishes no control over consultants. The California Senate will most likely
modify the bill to include some form of licensing provision. Id.
421. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico (July 8, 1977).
422. Interview With consular officer at the United States consulate in Monter-
rey, Mexico (July 21, 1977).
423. Interview With consular officer at the United States consulate in Guadala-
jara, Mexico (Aug. 8, 1977).
424. See notes 20-33 and accompanying text supra.
425. See notes 312-33 and accompanying text supra.
426. See notes 406-23 and accompanying text supra.
427. See notes 399.405 and accompanying text supra.
428. See notes 394-98 and accompanying text supra.
429. See notes 377-93 and accompanying text supra.
430. See notes 363-76 and accompanying text supra.
431. See notes 334-62 and accompanying text supra.
grant visas. The goal is to achieve more uniform application of
the immigration law and regulations within the boundaries of the
statutory grant of authority. Much progress toward the realiza-
tion of this goal is possible through the structuring and checking
of consular discretionary authority.
The visa-issuing process suffers from the State Department's
lack of accountability for the determinations of its consular of-
ficers. Although the Department may not directly control an of-
ficer's determinations, 43 2 it is responsible for training officers and
for providing regulations and instructions to enforce the Act.
43 3
Only the Department can ensure that its regulations and guide-
lines are clear and well-defined; only the Department can ensure
that a consular officer's determinations are within the bounds of
such guidelines.
Yet, this Study indicates that Departmental guidelines are often
vague and ill-defined. Different consular officers and consulates
interpret the law, the regulations, and the guidelines in vastly dis-
similar ways. Indeed, two officers may reach opposite determina-
tions on the same question of fact and law. The system of
checking these determinations is inadequate to ensure the uni-
form application of the law. Review at the post is often cursory
and sometimes deferred. Visa refusals occasionally pass com-
pletely unchecked. Aliens who are refused visas have little re-
course. It is the responsibility of the Department to correct these
problems through more effective structuring and checking.
Structuring Consular Discretion Through the Foreign Affairs
Manual
The Foreign Affairs Manual434 represents the Department's
principal attempt to structure consular discretion. The Manual is
a compilation of the Act and of Departmental regulations, inter-
pretations, and procedural notes. As a device to structure consu-
lar discretionary authority to issue or refuse visas, the Manual is
beset with problems.
Discretion is properly structured by isolating which factors ap-
ply and what weight they should be given in a particular determi-
nation.4 35 The primary means of structuring are through open
plans, policy statements, rules, findings, reasons, precedents, and
fair informal procedure.4 38 Yet the Manual contains few, if any,
432. L & N. Act § 104(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1970).
433. Id.
434. Manual, note 113 supra.
435. K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TExT 94 (3d ed. 1972).
436. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELmNARY INQUIRY 97 (1969).
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findings, reasons, or precedents relative to specific types of cases.
Moreover, those policies and rules that the Department publishes
are confusing to the consular officers.
One cause of the Manual's inadequate structuring of consular
discretion is the nonuniform application of Departmental policies
and rules. First, use of the Manual is erratic at best. Consular of-
ficers seldom refer to the Manual on routine cases such as those
under the public charge provision.437 Officers use the Manuai
more frequently in complicated cases 438 and, according to some
officers, at posts with a wider variety of cases.439 As a general
rule, consular officers seek the advice of co-workers or superiors
before consulting the Manual.4 0 One important reason for the
Manual's infrequent use is its propensity for complex terminol-
ogy.4 4 1 Officers find it difficult to understand.442 Even when of-
ficers do refer to the Manual, its application is not uniform. As
one officer stated: "Everyone interprets it for themselves."443 Said
another officer of the Manual: "I use it all the time, basically on
the theory that anything you want it to say, you can find it in the
Manual, just like the Bible."444
Still, the Manual is probably the most practical method avail-
able for structuring consular discretionary authority. Although in-
stituting a Board of Visa Appeals, for example, would involve
protracted administrative and legislative maneuvering, the
Manual is subject to expeditious revision. With relatively little
increase in manpower and resources, the Department and the
437. Interviews with consular officers at the United States consulates in Ciudad
Juarez and in Monterrey, Mexico (July 8 - 22, 1977).
438. At the consulate in Monterrey, Mexico, for example, consular officers de-
bate difficult fraud issues after referring to the exact language of the Manual. One
author witnessed several such debates at the United States consulate in Monter-
rey, Mexico (July 19-22, 1977).
439. Interviews with consular officers at the United States consulate in Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico (July 8 - 12, 1977).
440. Interviews with consular officers at the United States consulate in Guada-
lajara, Mexico (Aug. 8 - 12, 1977).
441. Regarding the Manual's complex terminology, one consular officer com-
plained that "the only thing worse is the Internal Revenue Code." Interview with
consular officer at the United States consulate in Guadalajara, Mexico (Aug. 12,
1977).
442. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico (July 11, 1977).
443. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Guadala-
jara, Mexico (Aug. 8, 1977).
444. Interview with consular officer at the United States Embassy in Mexico
City, Mexico (July 28, 1977).
Visa Office could incorporate into the Manual most of Professor
Davis's seven means of structuring discretion. 445
Findings, reasons, and precedents can be culled from illustra-
tive cases in the files of the Advisory Opinions Division of the
Visa Office and from those of posts worldwide. Many posts claim
to have precedent files, but use of such fies is time-consuming
and impractical. Abstracts of the files could form the beginning of
a digest of cases for inclusion in the Manual. At the same time,
the Department could clarify its policies, rules, and interpreta-
tions, presenting them in a more readable and understandable
fashion. The expediency with which the Department could alter
the Manual suggests its eminent practicality as a device for struc-
turing consular discretionary authority.
The Study findings suggest specific recommendations for altera-
tion of the Manual to structure further consular discretionary au-
thority to issue visas. One recommendation is that the
Department define the terms "public charge" and "dependent
family members" under the public charge provision. The designa-
tion "public charge," which accounts for the most visa refusals,
remains undefined in the Manual. At least one consular officer
believes that the failure to define the term "public charge" creates
confusion among consular officers.446 One reason for this confu-
sion is the myriad types of public assistance available in the
United States. Officers are not always certain under what condi-
tions receipt of public assistance renders an alien ineligible to re-
ceive a visa.447 The only treatment of the matter in the Manual
seems to be in the income poverty guidelines. The guidelines de-
fine "income" to include regular payments for public assistance,
social security, and unemployment compensation.44 8 What is
needed, however, is a clear definition of '"public charge" and a list
of the types of public assistance to aliens that render them ineligi-
ble for visas.
The Manual also should define and clarify Departmental policy
toward "dependent family members." Earlier this Study illus-
trated the problem of whether the applicant spouse is responsible
for the support of the petitioner spouse's children by a prior mar-
445. See notes 5-8 and accompanying text supra.
446. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico (July 8, 1977). See text accompanying notes 238-41 supra.
447. See text accompanying notes 238-41 supra.
448. Airgram from the Department of State to all American Diplomatic and
Consular Posts (except Chiang Mai) and the District Administrator of the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands, the Governor of American Samoa, and the Execu-
tive Secretary of the Canal Zone, Message Ref. No. A-2152 (5/17/77), income pov-
erty guideline tables (rev. May 25, 1977) (on file with the San Diego Law Review).
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riage.44 9 Another issue involves an applicant's responsibility for
the support of dependent family members remaining in the for-
eign country.450 Must an applicant meet the income poverty
guidelines for dependent family members remaining in the for-
eign country even if the cost of living in that country is well below
that in the United States? Consular officers and consulates
should not be free to answer this question differently for similarly
situated applicants. The Department should clearly define its pol-
icy regarding dependent family members and clarify the policy's
application to the income poverty guidelines.
Other policies under the public charge provision require clarifi-
cation. Technically, the policy providing for a presumption of in-
eligibility when an applicant relies solely on expected income that
falls below the income poverty guidelines may be consistent with
the policy prohibiting the use of a fixed sum as the sole criterion
in making the public charge determination,45 1 but the compatibil-
ity of these two policies is suspect. If flexibility in the consid-
eration of all relevant factors is the desired goal, the presumption
of ineligibility is inconsistent with it. The danger is that a harried
consular officer in the typical "visa mill" might rely to an inordi-
nate degree on the presumption of ineligibility. This Study indi-
cates that many officers do so rely.452 Departmental inclusion of
the ineligibility presumption in the regulations seems to sanction
this behavior. To attain flexibility in visa eligibility determina-
tions under the public charge provision, the Department should
remove the temptation inherent in its policy and dispense with
the presumption of ineligibility.
Finally, the Department should clarify in the Manual the ac-
ceptable requests for documentation to prove past and expected
income. The Visa Office has already instructed its posts on the
impropriety of certain requests for documents. It remains now to
incorporate into the Manual a policy statement on the subject
that lists acceptable requests for evidence.
Section 221(g) of the Act, the insufficient documentation provi-
sion,453 also should structure consular discretionary authority
449. See notes 227-29 and accompanying text supra.
450. See notes 230-32 and accompanying text supra.
451. See text accompanying notes 183-88 supra.
452. See notes 198-210 and accompanying text supra.
453. L & N. Act § 221(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g) (1976). See notes 81-109 and accom-
panying text supra.
more effectively. Currently, the provision invites abuse of consu-
lar discretion in two major ways. First, the insufficient documen-
tation provision is virtually devoid of substantive guidelines in
the Manual, yet it accounts for fifty-one percent of all initial re-
fusals. 454 Second, a consular officer may elect to defer review of
refusals pending presentation of additional evidence by the appli-
cant.455 As a result, the paucity of substantive guidelines and the
deferred review procedure remove any meaningful check on an
officer's decision.
The authors offer two recommendations to help solve this prob-
lem. First, the Department should incorporate into the Manual
complete lists of acceptable and unacceptable types of documen-
tation for each substantive ineligibility provision. Second, the De-
partment should abolish the deferred review procedure. A
decision to require additional documentation has the same force
and effect as a visa refusal. Such a decision should be checked by
a superior just as are other refusals.
Under the fraud provision of the Act,456 the most effective
means of structuring consular authority would be to publish
precedents in the Manual. Consular officers simply are not sure
under what circumstances an applicant is ineligible for a visa on
the ground of fraud. Consequently, even though officers suspect a
high incidence of fraud, few applicants are refused for fraud. A
compilation of precedents would help officers to identify cases of
forbidden fraud. An example of such a compilation can be found
in the Manual under the "crimes of moral turpitude" provision.457
A similar list is needed for types and circumstances of fraud that
render an applicant ineligible for a visa.
Finally, the Department should simplify the interpretative
materials in the Manual. Indeed, one consular officer complained
that: "As it stands now, things are explained four different times,
once in the law, once in the regulations, once in the interpretative
materials, and again in other sources." 458
This officer recommends that the Manual be rewritten to adopt
a step-by-step approach following the format of an interview with
an applicant. For each ground of visa ineligibility the Manual
would list a certain number of positive factors to be considered.
454. VISA OMC REPORT, supra note 19, at 76. When refusals overcome are in-
cluded, § 221(g) accounts for approximately 41% of all refusals. Id.
455. 22 C.F.R. § 42.130(b) (1977).
456. L & N. Act § 212(a) (19), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (19) (1976).
457. Manual, supra note 113, § 42.91(a) (9) note 4. See I. & N. Act § 212(a) (9), 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a) (9) (1976).
458. Interview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico (July 11, 1977).
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Qualifications for eligibility would also be listed. An officer would
merely go through the list ascertaining the presence or absence of
each factor.
The above recommended changes in the Manual would better
structure consular discretionary authority to issue and refuse im-
migrant visas. Moreover, these alterations would foster greater
use of the Manual because it would then be easier to understand
and apply. Greater use by consular officers of a more understand-
able Manual would, in turn, foster more uniform application of
the law and the regulations within the boundaries of the statutory
grant of authority.
Checking Consular Discretion Through Administrative Review
The Department's administrative review procedure 459 is inade-
quate as a check on consular discretionary authority. Although it
is conceptually sound, the procedure is poorly implemented. One
reason for this poor implementation is that reviewing officers sel-
dom refer cases for advisory opinions or take jurisdiction and is-
sue the visa. Another reason is that the scope of review is
minimal. An ordinary refusal sheet4 6 0 focuses little attention on
detail. Review of the refusal sheet is often pro forma and cursory.
Finally, the reviewing officer is not independent of those involved
in the original decision.
Several changes in the administrative review procedure are
necessary to provide more effective checking of consular discre-
tionary authority. First, the Department should require more
thorough evaluation of a case upon review. Such an evaluation
would require the reviewing officer to have detailed information
regarding the applicant's circumstances. Perhaps an expanded
refusal sheet containing a checklist of the matters discussed dur-
ing the interview would provide the necessary depth of informa-
tion. A reviewing officer would then have available virtually the
same degree of detail as the interviewing officer. Moreover, the
refusal sheet checklist might correspond to the Manual's list of
factors relevant to each ground of ineligibility suggested earlier.
Another means of providing more detail would be to grant an
alien limited access to the reviewing officer. This would entail ei-
ther an interview or the submission of the alien's own statement
459. See notes 110-70 and accompanying text supra.
460. See note 124 supra.
of facts. Such a procedure has the advantage of being eminently
fair. The reviewing officer would have a full complement of data,
and the applicant would have the opportunity to argue his case
before the ultimate decisionmaker. However, there are several
disadvantages. The procedure would consume precious time, fur-
ther erode the reviewing officer's independence, and perhaps as-
sume an unwanted measure of formality. Still, if interviewing
consular officers have access to reviewing officers, then aliens
should have access as well.
A second way to strengthen the checking value of the adminis-
trative review procedure is to utilize advisory opinions. The De-
partment should encourage reviewing officers to refer cases for
advisory opinions. Thus, the Visa Office could identify areas of
the law in which Departmental policy needs clarification. Review-
ing officers could then be instructed to forward cases involving
these issues. Such a procedure would provide consular officers
with guidance and the Visa Office with a collection of cases for
use in policy analysis. A similar system is already in use under
some grounds of ineligibility.461 It could easily be expanded by
requiring advisory opinions for other vague areas of the law.
Ultimately, consular discretionary authority to refuse immi-
grant visas should be checked by a system of administrative ap-
peals. Aliens refused immigrant visas should have a right of
appeal to a Board of Visa Appeals.462 Such a Board would struc-
ture as well as check consular discretionary authority. The
Board's decisions would help generate the open reasons, prece-
dents, rules, and policies needed better to structure consular dis-
cretionary authority.
Recommendations to Increase Consular Officers' Morale and
Competence
Maintaining high consular morale and competence is as impor-
tant to more uniform application of the immigration law as is
structuring and checking discretionary authority. Some consular
officers complain that incompetent colleagues apply the law in ac-
cordance with their own prejudices. Officers with low morale may
apply the law indifferently, using shortcuts in lieu of thoughtful
461. See text accompanying notes 147-48 supra.
462. A Board of Visa Appeals was first proposed during congressional debate
on the 1952 Act. Senators Lehman and Humphrey incorporated such a Board in
their alternative omnibus immigration bill, which was rejected by the Senate.
Representative Javits also proposed such a Board. See generally 98 CONG. REc.
passim (1952).
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analysis. The following recommendations are directed toward im-
proving consular competence and morale.
The Department should require formal training of consular of-
ficers to ensure that their visa determinations will be of high qual-
ity and integrity. The Department's new Rosslyn training center,
in Arlington, Virginia, is well-suited to this task. There, consular
officers develop an excellent background in immigration law.
However, Rosslyn alone is not enough. Consular officers should
undergo a training period at their posts as well. The new imm-
grant visa officer should be closely supervised, first as an observer
and then as a participant.
Ideally, certain posts could be designated training posts where
first-tour officers would receive on-the-job instruction before tak-
ing their first assignments. The Department could monitor desig-
nated training posts for proper compliance with its policies and
procedures. Thus, new officers would be trained as nearly as pos-
sible in accordance with Departmental policies and procedures.
Finally, the Department should convene regional consular semi-
nars to discuss problems and changes in visa policy. Such semi-
nars would effectively update consular training on a more formal
level.
However, even if consular officers were highly trained, inade-
quately staffed consulates would reduce the quality of consular
performance. The lag in filling consular staff requirements and an
earlier administration freeze on hiring local employees4 63 are two
major contributors to the problem of inadequately staffed consul-
ates. The effect on the already understaffed and overcrowded
consulates is particularly harsh. If the Department cannot pro-
vide adequate staff, it should instruct the consulates to reduce
their workloads accordingly.
Ultimately, consular morale suffers from the tediousness of visa
work and from the low expectations of promotion from it. To com-
bat this tediousness, the Department routinely rotates consular
officers among posts and to other non-visa duties. This rotation
policy should take into account that some locations are less desir-
able than others. Officers in Latin America, for example, often
463. At the time the authors visited the consulates, hiring additional local em-
ployees was forbidden without prior approval from the Department of State. In-
terview with consular officer at the United States consulate in Ciudad Juarez,
Mexico (July 8, 1977).
feel that they are doomed to stay in Latin America for the remain-
der of their careers. The Department should rotate these officers
in and out of Latin America as frequently as possible. Finally, the
Department should upgrade the stature of visa work through pro-
motion of visa personnel and through active career counseling
and planning.
Underlying many of these recommendations is the simple con-
cept of management accountability. By and large, most officers
perform well under difficult circumstances. If officers misapply
the law, it may be because no one corrects their errors. The au-
thors offer these recommendations in the hope that the Depart-
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This questionnaire is part of a scientific survey about immigrant visas. The San
Diego Law Review is conducting the survey under a grant from the National Sci-
ence Foundation and in cooperation with the Department of State. As you com-
plete the questionnaire please feel free to clarify any answer in the space
following each question. Each person's responses will be kept in strictest confi-
dence.





We are interested in information concerning your conditions at work.
2. a. During an average week, about how many hours do you work?
-HOURS.
b. Approximately what percentage is devoted to immigrant visas?
__PERCENT.
c. How many Immigrant Visa Officers are there in your consular section, in-
cluding yourself?
d. Do you feel your personal performance would improve if your office had
more officers? Please circle appropriate answer.
1. YES, Greatly Improve
2. YES, Somewhat Improve
3. YES, Improve a Little
4. NO, Not Improve at all
e. Do you feel management of your consular section could be improved?
1. YES, Greatly Improved
2. YES, Somewhat Improved
3. YES, Improved very little
4. NO, Not Improved at all
We are also interested in changes in your workload over the past year.
3. Were you employed as an Immigrant Visa Officer in your present post one
year ago?
1. YES 2. NO If NO, please go on to question 4.
a. Generally, are you granting a higher, lower, or about the same percentage





b. About how many immigrant visa applications do you consider in an aver-
age week?
NOW- A YEAR AGO__
c. On the average, about how much time do you spend per immigrant visa in-
terview?
_MINUTES.
d. Are there large seasonal fluctuations in the number of immigrant visa ap-
plications? 1. YES 2. NO. If yes, please explain apparent causes of such
fluctuations.
4. We recognize that there are many non-statutory factors which an Immigrant
Visa Officer must consider when making a preliminary decision on an immi-





5. Considering now the immigrant visa applications which you deny, what are




6. Some people have mentioned the following reasons for investigation of an ap-
plicant's eligibility. Not all of these reasons relate to statutory grounds.
Please note the most important statutory ground beside each of the following
items when applicable. If there is more than one ground, note additional
grounds on the spaces provided. (leave the spaces blank beside an item that
relates to no statutory ground).
Statutory Grounds
a. Negative attitude of applicant
toward the immigration pro-
cess
b. Cleanliness of applicant
c. Courtesy of applicant
d. Demeanor of applicant
e. Conviction for public disorder
or drunkenness
f. Apparent circumvention of the
immigration process
g. Dress of applicant
h. Ethnic background of appli-
cant
i. Ideological views
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j. Medical problems
k. Mental or psychological
problems
1. Neatness of applicant
m. Excluded from admission pre-
viously
n. Previous visa refusal
o. The applicant is elderly
p. Applicant is other than your
own sex
q. Applicant is a woman
r. Applicant speaks no English
s. Applicant lacks a high school
education
t. Applicant is represented by an
attorney
u. Congressional interest
v. Petitioner has adjusted status
w. Applicant seems arrogant
x. Other factors (non-statutory)
(Please list)
7. We are also interested in the number of times each factor is applied and the
relative weight given to each item when making a preliminary decision on an
immigrant visa. First, note the frequency such factors appear when consider-
ing an application in blanks under the column labeled "FREQUENCY" (If you
use an item very frequently mark a 5, fairly frequently mark a 4, not very fre-
quently mark a 3, not at all frequently mark a 2, and if you never consider an
item mark a 1 beside it).
Frequency Weight
a. Negative attitude of applicant toward the
immigration process
b. Cleanliness of applicant
c. Courtesy of applicant
d. Demeanor of applicant
e. Conviction for public disorder or drunken-
ness
f. Apparent circumvention of the immigra-
tion process
g. Dress of applicant
h. Ethnic background of applicant
i. Ideological views
j. Medical problems
k. Mental or psychological problems
1. Neatness of applicant
m. Excluded from admission previously
n. Previous visa refusal
o. The applicant is elderly
p. Applicant is other than your own sex
q. Applicant is a woman
r. Applicant speaks no English
s. Applicant lacks a high school education
t. Applicant is represented by an attorney
u. Congressional interest
v. Petitioner has adjusted status
w. Applicant seems arrogant
Now, we'd like you to indicate the weight given each item when considering
an application. Just go back and mark a 5 beside an item if you consider it to
be conclusive, a 4 if you consider it of great weight, a 3 if some weight is given,
a 2 if little weight is given, and a I if you consider it to have no weight in con-
sideration of an application.
8. What are the most important factors you consider in determining whether the
applicant is likely to be refused under INA § 212(a) (15)? Please list as many




9. What weight is given each of the following factors when deciding whether to
refuse an applicant under § 212(a) (15)? Circle the number beside each item
that corresponds most closely with the weight you give that factor when pass-
ing upon the application.
Great Some Little No
Conclusive Weight Weight Weight Weight
a. Whether the alien has ever re- 1 2 3 4 5
ceived welfare benefits or
their equivalent
b. Whether any member of the 1 2 3 4 5
alien's family has received
welfare benefits or their
equivalent
c. Affidavit of support 1 2 3 4 5
d. Job offer from a United States 1 2 3 4 5
employer
e. Alien's prior work experience 1 2 3 4 5
f. Type of work being offered 1 2 3 4 5
g. Wages offered 1 2 3 4 5
h. Alien's educational back- 1 2 3 4 5
ground
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i. Alien's English language skills 1 2 3 4 5
j. Financial assets of alien or his 1 2 3 4 5
family
k. Applicant is over 50 1 2 3 4 5
1. Applicant is a woman 1 2 3 4 5
m. Number of persons dependent 1 2 3 4 5
on applicant for support
n. Final destination of alien 1 2 3 4 5
o. Nationality 1 2 3 4 5
p. Alien's prospective income is 1 2 3 4 5
slightly above poverty level
q. Applicant is self-confident 1 2 3 4 5
10. What are the most important things you look for in determining whether the
applicant is telling the truth?
11. The next series of questions deals with legal guidelines or interpretative
materials you may use, including any pertaining to non-statutory factors af-
fecting your decision. Please circle the number beside the most appropriate
response for each question.
a. How frequently are any legal guidelines used?
1. VERY FREQUENTLY
2. FAIRLY FREQUENTLY
3. NOT VERY FREQUENTLY
4. NOT AT ALL FREQUENTLY
5. NEVER
b. How frequently are interpretative materials used?
1. VERY FREQUENTLY
2. FAIRLY FREQUENTLY
3. NOT VERY FREQUENTLY
4. NOT AT ALL FREQUENTLY
5. NEVER
c. Do you receive materials or guidelines from the State Department?
1. YES 2. NO
If YES, answer the following





2. How often are the legal guidelines updated?
1. MONTHLY
2. ANNUALLY
3. EVERY FEW YEARS
4. RARELY





4. How often are such interpretative materials revised?
1. MONTHLY
2. ANNUALLY
3. EVERY FEW YEARS
4. RARELY
d. Do you receive materials or guidelines from the local Embassy?
1. YES 2. NO
If YES, answer the following.





2. How often are the legal guidelines updated?
1. MONTHLY
2. ANNUALLY
3. EVERY FEW YEARS
4. RARELY





4. How often are such interpretative materials revised?
1. MONTHLY
2. ANNUALLY
3. EVERY FEW YEARS
4. RARELY
e. Do you receive materials or guidelines from your own office?
1. YES 2. NO
If YES, answer the following:





2. How often are the legal guidelines updated?
1. MONTHLY
2. ANNUALLY
3. EVERY FEW YEARS
4. RARELY





4. How often are such interpretative materials revised?
1. MONTHLY
2. ANNUALLY
3. EVERY FEW YEARS
4. RARELY
f. How could the legal guidelines and interpretative materials best be im-
proved to enhance the performance of your job?
[VOL 16: 87, 1978] Consular Discretion Study
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
12. In arriving at a decision on an immigrant visa, about how often do you make
use of the following sources? Circle the number beside each item that corre-
sponds to your own view.
Very Somewhat
Frequently Frequently Occasionally Never
a. Advisory opinions 1 2 3 4
b. Your own prior cases 1 2 3 4
c. Co-workers' prior cases 1 2 3 4
d. Consultation with superior 1 2 3 4
e. Consultation With co-work- 1 2 3 4
ers
f. Consultation with other
persons
(Please specify)
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
g. Your own common sense 1 2 3 4
h. Other sources (Please
specify)
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
13. When you refuse an immigrant visa, to what extent do you set forth your rea-
sons?
Please circle the number beside each item that reflects your own practices.
Yes No
a. I explain the reasons orally to the alien. 1 2
b. I give the alien reasons in writing. 1 2
c. I make a written notation in the file, which eventually 1 2
goes to - (Please state position).
d. I explain orally to - (Please state position). 1 2
e. I tell the alien the reasons if he requests them. 1 2
f. I do not set forth the reasons. 1 2
14. When you refuse an immigrant visa, to what extent do you inform the alien of
the review process? Circle the number beside each item which corresponds to
your practices.
Yes No
a. I automatically explain the review process orally to the 1 2
alien.
b. I notify the alien in writing of the review process. 1 2
c. I tell the alien of the review process if he asks about it. 1 2
d. I do not inform the alien of the review process. 1 2
15. a. About how often does your supervising officer personally review your deci-




4. NOT VERY OFTEN
5. NEVER
What is her/his title?
b. Does your supervising officer personally review your decisions denying im-




4. NOT VERY OFTEN
5. NEVER
c. If your decisions were to be reviewed by a supervisory officer in your con-
sular section, would the review have any effect on your decisions? Circle
the one number that best corresponds to your own view.
1. YES. In close cases, I would tend to lean toward granting the visa.
2. YES. In close cases, I would tend to lean toward denying the visa.
3. YES. Because of this review, I would make a special effort to reach the
same result the supervisor would reach.
4. NO. It would not affect my decision.
d. Of those aliens whose immigrant visa applications you deny, about what
percentage of them seek further review in Washington, D.C.?__%
e. Of those applications in which advisory review is sought, about what per-
centage of the time does the Visa Office recommend that you change your
decisionZ_..._%
f. When the Advisory Opinion Section does recommend that you change your
opinion, about what percentage of the time do you accept the recommenda-
tion? %
g. Does the fact that your decision might be reviewed in the Visa Office affect
your decision in any way? Circle the one number beside the item that best
corresponds to your own view.
1. YES. In close cases, I tend to lean toward granting the visa.
2. YES. In close cases, I tend to lean toward denying the visa.
3. YES. Because of this review, I make a special effort to reach the same
result that Washington would reach.
4. NO. It does not affect my decision.
h. Does the fact that politicians may bring pressure to bear on the process af-
fect your decision?
1. YES 2. NO If YES, How?
i. Does such outside pressure affect the equity of the immigrant visa proc-
ess?
1. YES 2. NO If YES, How?
j. Have you ever felt that the overall number of visas you grant or deny would
affect your career?
1. YES 2. NO If YES, How?
16. Finally, we would like the following background information:
a. How many years in your career have you been an Immigrant Visa Officer?
__EARS MONTHS
b. About how long have you been at your present post?
YEARS MONTHS
[VOL 16: 87, 19781 Consular Discretion Study
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
c. How pleased are you with your present assignment? (as a Consular Of-
ficer)






d. How pleased are you with your current location? Circle the number which






e. How pleased is your family with your current location? Circle the number






f. How long have you been employed by the Foreign Service? Circle applica-
ble number.




5. OVER 25 YEARS






h. How many more years do you plan to work for the Service?
___YEARS
i. How many years of education have you completed? Circle appropriate
number.
1. 12 YEARS (High School)
2. 13-15 YEARS (Some College)
3. 16 YEARS (College Degree)
4. 17-18 YEARS (Some graduate work)
5. 18+ YEARS (Graduate Degree)







4. OTHER (Please Specify)






5. OTHER (Please Specify)




Thank you very much for your help in this project. Please put this questionnaire
in the stamped, pre-addressed envelope and just drop it in the mail.
Consular Discretion Study








1. Assisting the applicants in general, explaining
the laws, expediting applications 32
2. Insufficient time/heavy workload 26
3. Interpreting & administering the law 26
4. Interference from the public/
Congressmen/attorneys 26
5. Detecting fraud 21
6. Evaluating documentation 21
Question #2: Hours worked.
2(a) 40 hours 46
41-45 hours 24
46-50 hours 22
over 50 hours 8













* This Appendix partially reproduces a computer tabulation of consular of-
ficers' responses to the questionnaire, Appendix A supra. The computer printout
from which this Appendix was derived is on file with the San Diego Law Review.
For a description of research methodology, see notes 20-33 and accompanying text
supra.
** Because of rounding, some columns will not add up to 100%. Similarly, some
questions list only frequencies of response rather than tabulations.
2(d) Would more officers improve performance?
(1) Yes, greatly
(2) Yes, somewhat
(3) Yes, a little
(4) No
2(e) Could management be improved?
(1) Yes, greatly
(2) Yes, somewhat
(3) Yes, a little
(4) No
Question #3: Were you employed as an immigrant visa oincer
post one year ago?
Yes
No
No answer, not applicable
3(a) Generally, are you granting a higher, lower, or about
the same percentage of immigrant visas




(4) No answer, not applicable
3(b) About how many immigrant visa applications






























(1) Under 10 26
(2) 10-49 19
(3) 50-200 12
(4) Over 200 2
(5) No answer, not applicable 40
3(c) On the average, about how much time do
you spend per immigrant visa interview?
(1) Under 10 minutes 12
(2) 10-20 43
(3) Over 20 10
(4) No answer, not applicable 35
3(d) Are there large seasonal fluctuations in the
number of immigrant visa applications?
(1) Yes 11
(2) No 63
(3) No answer, not applicable 26
Question #4- Non-statutory factors used when making a preliminary decision on an
immigrant visa application.
1. Ability, willingness to work, skills,
job history, etc. 21
2. Do not consider non-statutory factors 19
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% of officers
responding
3. Strength and validity of relationship
with petitioner 12
4. Assets of applicant 11
Question #5: Most frequent causes for denial of immigration visa applications.
1. Insufficient financial support 63
2. Insufficient documentation 40
3. Conviction for or commission of crimes
of moral turpitude 24
4. Fraud or misrepresentation in family
relations, job offers, etc. 20
5. Labor certification invalid 14
6. Low refusal post or no refusals 14
7. Mental illness 11
8. Communist affiliation 11
9. Medical 10
Question #8: What are the most important factors you consider in determining
whether an applicant is likely to be refused under INA § 212(a) (15)?
1. Job offer in U.S. and job prospects 50
2. Affidavit 41
3. Post-employment record 35
4. Ability to support 29
5. Financial position 28
6. Skills & qualifications 20
7. Number of dependents 17
8. Age 15
Question #10: Most important things looked for in determining whether the appli-
cant is telling the truth.




Question #11: Legal and interpretative materials used.
11(a) How frequently are any legal
guidelines used?
(1) Very frequently 54
(2) Fairly frequently 33
(3) Not very frequently 11
(4) Not at all frequently 1
(5) Never 0
(6) No answer, not applicable 0
11(b) How frequently are interpretative materials used?
(1) Very frequently 42
(2) Fairly frequently 37
(3) Not very frequently 17
(4) Not at all frequently 2
(5) Never 0
(6) No answer, not applicable 0
% of officers
responding




(3) No answer, not applicable 0
11(c) (1)-How explicit are the legal guidelines?
(1) Very explicit 21
(2) Somewhat explicit 56
(3) Fairly general 17
(4) Extremely vague 1
(5) No answer, not applicable 5




(3) Every few years 38
(4) Rarely 13
(5) As needed 9
(6) No answer, not applicable 5
11 (c) (3)-How explicit are the interpretative
materials?
(1) Very explicit 15
(2) Somewhat explicit 56
(3) Fairly general 20
(4) Extremely vague 6
(5) No answer, not applicable 3




(3) Every few years 43
(4) Rarely 11
(5) As needed 10
(6) No answer, not applicable 6
11(d) Do you receive materials or guide-
lines from the local Embassy?
(1) Yes 20
(2) No 67
(3) No answer, not applicable 13
11(d) (1)-How explicit are the legal guidelines?
(1) Very explicit 4
(2) Somewhat explicit 11
(3) Fairly general 4
(4) Extremely vague 0
(5) No answer, not applicable 81




(3) Every few years 6
(4) Rarely 1
(5) As needed 1
(6) No answer, not applicable 86
11 (d) (3)-How explicit are the interpretative
materials?
(1) Very explicit 9
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% of officers
responding
(2) Somewhat explicit 7
(3) Fairly general 2
(4) Extremely vague 0
(5) No answer, not applicable 82




(3) Every few years 4
(4) Rarely 0
(5) As needed 1
(6) No answer, not applicable 85
11(e) Do you receive materials or
guidelines from your own office?
(1) Yes 35
(2) No 54
(3) No answer, not applicable 11
11(e) (1)-How explicit are the legal guidelines?
(1) Very explicit 15
(2) Somewhat explicit 13
(3) Fairly general 2
(4) Extremely vague 1
(5) No answer, not applicable 68




(3) Every few years 4
(4) Rarely 9
(5) No answer, not applicable 68
11(e) (3)-How explicit are the interpretative
materials?
(1) Very explicit 18
(2) Somewhat explicit 15
(3) Fairly general 2
(4) Extremely vague 0
(5) No answer, not applicable 65




(3) Every few years 5
(4) Rarely 7
(5) No answer, not applicable 67
11(f) How could the legal guidelines and
interpretative materials best be
improved to enhance the performance of
your job?
(1) Simplify Manual, clearer, etc. 24
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(2) Revise & update Manual more frequently 26
(3) Adequate 10
(4) More precedents 7
Question #12: In arriving at a decision on an immigrant visa, about how often do
you make use of the following sources?
12(a) Advisory opinions.
(1) Very frequently 5
(2) Somewhat frequently 20
(3) Occasionally 69
(4) Never 6
(5) No answer, not applicable 0
12(b) Your own prior cases.
(1) Very frequently 25
(2) Somewhat frequently 43
(3) Occasionally 28
(4) Never 4
(5) No answer, not applicable 0
12(c) Co-workers' prior cases.
(1) Very frequently 13
(2) Somewhat frequently 24
(3) Occasionally 39
(4) Never 18
(5) No answer, not applicable 5
12(d) Consultation with superior.
(1) Very frequently 9
(2) Somewhat frequently 23
(3) Occasionally 46
(4) Never 16
(5) No answer, not applicable 5
12(e) Consultation with co-workers.
(1) Very frequently 16
(2) Somewhat frequently 26
(3) Occasionally 32
(4) Never 19
(5) No answer, not applicable 7
12(f) Consultation with other persons.
(1) Very frequently 7
(2) Somewhat frequently 4
(3) Occasionally 29
(4) Never 22
12(g) Your own common sense.
(1) Very frequently 60
(2) Somewhat frequently 24
(3) Occasionally 9
(4) Never 0
(5) No answer, not applicable 7
12(h) Other sources.
(1) Very frequently 36
(2) Somewhat frequently 15
(3) Occasionally 11
(4) Never 7
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Question #13: When you refuse an immigrant visa, to what extent do you set forth'
your reasons?
13(a) I explain the reasons orally to the alien.
(1) Yes 98
(2) No 2
(3) No answer, not applicable 0
13(b) I give the alien reasons in writing.
(1) Yes 71
(2) No 21
(3) No answer, not applicable 8
13(c) I make a written notation in the file,
which eventually goes to
(1) Yes 81
(2) No 5
(3) No answer, not applicable 14
13(d) I explain orally to
(1) Yes 21
(2) No 49
(3) No answer, not applicable 30




(3) No answer, not applicable 30
13(f) I do not set forth the reasons.
(1) Yes 0
(2) No 73
(3) No answer, not applicable 27
Question #14: When you refuse an immigrant visa, to what extent do you inform
the alien of the review process?
14(a) I automatically explain the review process
orally to the alien.
(1) Yes 63
(2) No 24
(3) No answer, not applicable 13




(3) No answer, not applicable 15
14(c) I tell the alien of the review process
if he asks about it.
(1) Yes 39
(2) No 34
(3) No answer, not applicable 27






(3) No answer, not applicable 28
Question #15:
15(a) About how often does your supervisory
officer personally review your decision
granting immigrant visas?
(1) Always 8
(2) Nearly always 2
(3) Sometimes 11
(4) Not very often 26
(5) Never 49
(6) No answer, not applicable 4
15(b) Does your supervising officer per-
sonally review your decisions
denying immigrant visas?
(1) Always 50
(2) Nearly always 5
(3) Sometimes 6
(4) Not very often 15
(5) Never 17
(6) No answer, not applicable 7
15(c) If your decisions were to be reviewed
by a supervisory officer in your consular
section, would the review have any effect
on your decision?
(1) Yes, lean toward granting 5
(2) Yes, lean toward denying 1
(3) Yes, reach the same result 7
(4) No, not affect decision 72
(5) No answer, not applicable 15
15(d) Of those aliens whose immigrant visas
you deny, about what percentage seek
further review in Washington, D.C.?
(1) Under 10 32
(2) 10-50 10
(3) Over 50 1
(4) No answer, not applicable 57
15(e) Percentage of time the Visa Office
recommends a change in decision
when advisory review is sought.
(1) Under 10 10
(2) 10-40 13
(3) Over 40 0
(4) No answer, not applicable 77
15(f) Percentage of time that immigrant visa
officer accepts the recommendation of




15(g) (4) No answer, not applicable 58
The effect of a possible review in
the Visa Office.
(1) Yes, lean toward granting visa 7
(2) Yes, lean toward denying visa 0
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(3) Yes, reach same result 10
(4) No, not affect decision 78
(5) No answer, not applicable 5
15(h) Whether politicians may bring pressure
to bear on the decision-making process
of the immigrant visa officer.
(1) Yes 23
(2) No 76
(3) No answer, not applicable 0
15(h) (1)-How political pressure affects the
officers.
(1) Lean toward issuing in close cases--- 7
(2) Must document refusals carefully 7
(3) Makes me take another look 2
(4) Makes me suspicious 1
(5) No answer, not applicable 82
15(i) The effect of the outside pressure on the
equity of the immigrant visa process.
(1) Yes 54
(2) No 45
(3) No answer, not applicable 1
15(i) (1)-How the outside pressure affects the
system.
(1) Aliens with outside pressure get
more attention 20
(2) Some C.O.'s (weak) inclined to
give in 5
(3) No refusals, no trouble 2
(4) Allows unqualified applicants in 11
(5) Takes valuable time 6
(6) No answer, not applicable 56
15(j) Is there an effect on career based upon
the number of visas granted or denied?
(1) Yes 13
(2) No 87
(3) No answer, not applicable 0
15(j) (1)-What effect?
(1) Shouldn't make waves by denying
large numbers 5
(2) Supervisor may influence
efficiency report 5
(3) State Department inspectors criti-
cized past for low output 1
(4) No answer, not applicable 89
Question #16: Background information.
16(a) How many years have you been an immigrant visa officer?
(1) Under one year 35
(2) One to two years 29
(3) Two to three years 7
(4) Three to five years 12
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(5) Over five years 17
(6) No answer, not applicable 0
16(b) How long have you been at your present post?
(1) Under six months 19
(2) Six to twelve months 27
(3) One year to eighteen months 21
(4) Eighteen months to two years 18
(5) Two to three years 12
(6) Over three years 3
(7) No answer, not applicable 0
16(c) How pleased are you with your current assignment as a consu-
lar officer?
(1) Very pleased 33
(2) Reasonably pleased 40
(3) Not displeased 15
(4) Displeased 12
(5) No answer, not applicable 0
16(d) How pleased are you with your current location?
(1) Very pleased 41
(2) Reasonably pleased 34
(3) Not displeased 11
(4) Displeased 14
(5) No answer, not applicable 0
16(e) How pleased is your family with your current location?
(1) Very pleased 26
(2) Reasonably pleased 28
(3) Not displeased 14
(4) Displeased 14
(5) No answer, not applicable 18
16(f) How long have you been employed by the Foreign Service?
(1) Fewer than six years 52
(2) Six years or more 48
(3) No answer, not applicable 0
16(g) What is your age?
(1) Under forty 70
(2) Forty or over 30
(3) No answer, not applicable 0
16(h) How many more years do you plan to work for
the Foreign Service?
(1) Less than one year 7
(2) One to three years 20
(3) Three to five years 12
(4) Five to fifteen years 17
(5) Fifteen to twenty years 18
(6) Over twenty years 26
(7) No answer, not applicable 0
16(i) How many years of education have you completed?
(1) Fewer than seventeen years 34
(2) Seventeen years or more 66
(3) No answer, not applicable 0
16(j) Do you have a working knowledge of the native language?
(1) Yes 82
(2) No 16
(3) No answer, not applicable 2
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16(j) Do you have a working knowledge of the native language?
(1) Yes 82
(2) No 16














(3) Do not care to state 4

